

Bending

The Department of State

bulletin

Vol. XXVII, No. 59

November 17, 1953



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VOL. XXVII, No. 699 • PUBLICATION 4783

November 17, 1952

The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication compiled and edited in the Division of Publications, Office of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, as well as legislative material in the field of international relations, are listed currently.

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington 25, D.C.

PRICE:
52 issues, domestic \$7.50, foreign \$10.25
Single copy, 20 cents

The printing of this publication has been approved by the Director of the Bureau of the Budget (January 22, 1952).

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United States Commitments

PART I. THE END OF ISOLATION

by Charles B. Marshall

I am going to discuss the foreign policy of the United States not in terms of chronology and arithmetic but in broader terms which I hope will make clear the world outlook of my country and its role in international life as an American sees it.

Let us start with what a foreign policy is. It is a settled course of action undertaken by a government to affect matters beyond the span of its own jurisdiction.

I wish to dwell a moment on that word "government." A metaphoric expression, it derives from a Greek word related to the control and guidance of a ship in motion.

The metaphor is just. By understanding its implications we can understand some of the canons of government relevant to its exterior relationships as well as to the internal exercise of power.

Let me take first of all the idea of responsibility. I recall once congratulating a Philippine pilot for a cool and deft performance in bringing a hospital ship alongside a tanker in a heavy sea. He said in response: "The pilot's job is to watch the signs and the instruments and not to listen to the beat of his own heart."

That comment reflected a responsible rather than a romantic view of his role. In the proportions applicable to the art of steering a ship, the ship is antecedent to the pilot. He is essentially only its servant.

Power Limitations

Let me add something concerning the limits of power. The discretion exercised on the bridge of a ship has capability to destroy far greater than the capability to achieve. A moment's misjudgment or one passing decision dictated by passion rather than reason can bring on catastrophe. Yet to bring a ship soundly through a voyage requires

unremitting judgment and tedious work done under pressure over a long span of time. It is given to the authority on the bridge only to contribute to the achievement and never alone to ordain it. Success depends on many factors beyond the authority of the ship's master.

The man functioning on the bridge must take the ship and the situation as they are. In determining a course ahead he can take as his point of departure only the actual locus of the ship at the moment. The elements which bear upon the sailing are beyond his fiat. He can foresee them limitedly. He cannot ordain them. He can only use them as they develop.

One cannot exercise discretion in government any more than in navigating a ship by pretending that it is another day, another place, and a different situation.

It may properly be given to a government to modify and to help in improving step by step the conditions of the society within which it functions. Tyranny takes over when a government presumes to transcend limits of what is feasible in freedom and by force to make over a society in the image of the dreams of those who rule.

If it is tragic to disregard the limits of power within, it is catastrophic to disregard them in external relations. Nothing else has brought so much suffering in our lifetime as the impulse of rulers to attempt to extend their domination beyond the feasible scope and to seek by will and force what the limits imposed by reason deny.

If it is tragic for government to become only the wanton employment of power by rulers who regard it as an instrument of their own impulses and desires and who use their power only for the sake of begetting more power, it is fatal for it to become merely a device for arresting change altogether.

Progressive Aims Important

The simple and enduring purpose of American foreign policy is to preserve in the world a situation enabling the survival and success of those principles as political realities in the United States.

Those ideas underlying the American constitutional structure were not the invention of Americans. They came from Europe. They were adapted into American forms by a generation whose leaders had learned from Locke, Harrington, Bellarmine, Montesquieu, and others the wisdom of politics in its highest sense developed over the centuries of European experience.

The American Nation is in an essential way a product—and if I may say so without undue boasting, in some ways a most successful product—of a movement of peoples, culture, and power out of Europe and into areas across the seas, beginning roughly 450 years ago.

The results of that movement have varied widely area by area in relation to a number of factors: the degree of the motherland's desire to keep leading strings on the overseas outpost; the character of the political institutions translated overseas; the accessibility, the contours, the climate, and the value of natural resources of the overseas areas; the numbers of the native peoples and the depth and strength of their culture; the conditions of politics and power in the world framework coincident with the development of the overseas land.

With respect to the emergence of the United States the combination of factors was most favorable.

First, the burdens of overseas interference with the English colonists in America were minimal. The attempt of the homeland authority to attach leading strings came too late, and its result was only to impel the colonists to cut the lines of allegiance.

Second, the institutions implanted here from abroad were those of free individuals regarding government as their instrument and not themselves as the instrument of government.

Third, nature was kind but not indulgent. It offered opportunity rather than bounty. The continental range was well forested, richly endowed in soil in broad and accessible expanses, with a proliferation of natural wealth under the surface and natural waterways without equal. Others often misjudge the degree of our ease and our plenty. D. W. Brogan closes his latest book with a story of an immigrant outside the Grand Central Station in New York. He was asked what 40 years of observing life in America had taught him. He reflected and replied, "There is no free lunch."

Fourth, the aboriginal population presented no great problems. It was sparse. Its culture was simple. Though the Indians confronted the settlers in some three dozen wars—the last of them only 62 years ago—their hostility was sporadic.

Fifth, the position was far enough away to avoid immediate and heavy pressures from the powers in other continents and yet not so remote as to impede commerce and restrict the flow of objects and ideas of culture and the influx of immigrants.

Sixth, the circumstances of world politics afforded the Americans a golden chance. This point I shall spell out.

Though I should not wish to say this in a Fourth-of-July oration, I shall admit here that the success of the Americans' bid for independence was not the product solely of their feats at arms but was attributable also to foreign assistance and to a resourceful diplomacy which made avail of its opportunities, first to win independence in combination with enemies of the Crown and second to win recognition of independence in a separate peace.

Moreover, the great movement of the Americans out from their Atlantic beachhead and across the continent was made possible by the shielding circumstance of the distribution of power in world relations among several nations of great magnitude.

This dispersion of power only half explains, however, the insulation enjoyed by the Americans in the period of expansion. The other half of the explanation we can find in their reciprocal determination to go it alone, to avoid involvements that could only impede their penetration of the continent. This was in keeping with Washington's farewell advice to avoid alliances until the maturing of the Nation's institutions.

The Monroe Doctrine

That combination of a dispersion of power in the Old World and a determination by the Americans to go the course alone was reflected in the historic attitude—given in the course of time the name of the Monroe Doctrine—by which the United States marked out the American Hemisphere as a zone of immunity against colonial penetration and interdicted the reconquest of the areas to the south where political independence from the European homelands had been established.

That prudent determination to stand aloof was essential as a condition for the diplomacy which, in a series of successes in foreign negotiation never surpassed and perhaps never equaled by a state in a like period, opened the way for the filling in of the continental position. One needs only to recall the main points of the series—the Jay Treaty, the Louisiana Purchase, the Florida annexation, the Oregon boundary settlement, the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, the Gadsden Purchase, the acquisition of Alaska, and the establishment of exclusive American rights in an isthmian canal. This aspect of the American expansion has largely been forgotten by Americans,

who tend to think of the national development as the work of the pioneers unassisted.

This old habit of aloofness from the political concerns of the old Continent was essential in its time also to the growth of the American Nation to a variousness of peoples and culture far beyond the original situation. The Nation founded by a generation born and brought to maturity as subjects of the British Crown came to encompass lands whose peoples traced their antecedents to Spain and France. The expansion invited—indeed it required—an inthroning from southern, eastern, northern, central, and western Europe and the British Isles. To have attempted taking sides in foreign issues before these had been transformed in the alembic of America might have been dangerously divisive.

In brief, I am saying that America grew to its greatness in isolation.

The word "isolation" has become a charged word in the American lexicon, taking on the meanings of default in the wider responsibilities and of obscurantism in policy. Virtually no one is willing to admit to being an advocate of isolation.

Yet we must see it in historic proportions. Isolation was the logical and prudent condition of U.S. foreign relations in the epoch of creating a nation from a potpourri of ethnic origins and filling out a continental range.

Isolation presented the opportunity for the Americans to develop the free institutions of government which reflect the best elements of the traditions of Europe's development over many centuries—combining the standards of the Greek with those of the Roman tradition, the test of rightness with the test of effectiveness.

Death of Isolation Policy

It is well here to distinguish between isolation as the situation serving in the historic past as a framework of U.S. foreign policy and isolation as a set of subjective attitudes toward the world.

As a framework of policy, isolation did not represent unconcern about the conditions of power in the world. It represented a realistic appreciation of the conditions of power during the decades in which the United States filled out its domain—and I take leave of it here in the words of a song popular in my youth, "Wasn't it wonderful while it lasted?"

The byproduct in terms of assumptions and feelings about the world and politics and the factors of power was something else.

Some of the byproduct attitudes of the epoch of isolation still clutter the way of thinking about foreign policy in the United States. Their occasional emergence in public discussion reminds one of Lord Salisbury's observation to the effect that the most common error in politics is to stick to the carcasses of dead policies. That the policy is

dead is more significant for us here than that the force of habit still occasionally calls up the modes of thinking that were relevant in the era of its vitality.

I cannot tell the precise moment at which the pattern of isolation expired. We can date the beginning of its decline at about the end of the last century when, within a short span of time, the United States, by eliminating the last of the internal frontiers, rounded out its continental domain and in the Spanish-American War emerged as a naval power. Thereafter the isolationist pattern sank and rallied by turns over a considerable span. Finally it passed away at some unperceived moment. Its death certificate was issued in the pattern of alliances into which the United States has entered in the past 5 years.

The Making of U.S. Foreign Policy

Now here I might well digress to say something about the making of foreign policy in the United States and about the great running debate through which the American people and their Government have been resolving the national will in the face of changing factors in recent years as related to foreign policy in general and to the strategic policy aspects in particular.

Our foreign policy has, I think, three general purposes related to serving the national interests. One of them is keeping the position safe—that is, preserving the territorial integrity of the United States. The second is keeping our creed intact. The third is the preservation of the physical standard of life for our people.

Now do not construe too narrowly what I mean by the serving of the interests of the United States. Any country's foreign policy should serve its national interests. The real test is whether the country concerned undertakes to serve them wantonly or responsibly—that is, whether it conceives its national interests to exclude the interests of others or seeks to discover and enhance the identities of interests between itself and others.

By strategic policy I refer to that part of foreign policy which is aimed to protect the territorial integrity of the United States, and in that I include all the steps necessary to prevent attack against our country and to insure a capability to bring to bear the forces required to defeat any powers set against us.

The President's Role in International Relations

The chief authority as to our foreign policy is the President. The Supreme Court has referred to him as "the sole organ of the Federal Government in international relations." He makes the decisions about engaging in or breaking diplomatic interchange with other governments, disposes the power to command our Armed Forces,

appoints or removes the highest agents in foreign policy and the highest military magistrates, and can speak out with the highest authoritativeness for other governments or the world to hear.

One of his attributes is that he is the chief of the state, filling the role, replete with symbolic significance, of head of the Nation on a level above all particular differences.

Another of his attributes is that he is the head of the Government. That is, he disposes power at the efficient as well as the formal apex of authority.

The third is that he is the head of one or the other of the two political groupings—called parties, though they are distinctly less unified and subjected to central discipline than parties in the European sense—which compete for support and position before the American electorate.

A fourth attribute is that he is an organ of public information. When the President says something, the word gets around, because his saying it will make it news. The most devoted editor of a newspaper of the opposite political persuasion would feel constrained—not by law or compulsion but by the usages of American life—to give space and prominence in his columns to what the President says.

A President does not carry on foreign policy alone. For one thing he needs counsel in making up his mind about how to dispose his power in particular situations of crux requiring decision.

He can draw this where he wishes—within or beyond the confines of the Government. If the matter in hand involves relations with other governments, he will certainly seek—though he is not bound to follow—the advice of his Secretary of State. If the matter involves the disposal of the military power, he will certainly seek, though again he is not bound to follow, the advice of his leading military subordinates. If the matter impinges on both foreign affairs and military considerations, he will certainly seek the advice of his advisers in both fields, and it will be his role to resolve any differences in their advice.

If a decision is one requiring a contractual undertaking with some other government or governments, then the President can initiate the contract, but he alone cannot effectuate it. In such an instance he must get the concurrence of two-thirds of the Senate—that is, the House of our Legislature whose membership is equally distributed among our forty-eight component States.

If a decision is one requiring an authorization in statutory law or the commitment of money, then the President can effectuate it only after both Houses of the Congress have assented by giving the authorization required or granting him the funds. The Congress may add its own conditions to the authorization or the appropriation. Moreover, in granting either, the Congress acts exactly. A determinative majority of the members of each House must be persuaded to go along.

They cannot be compelled, for such compulsion is beyond the usages and resources of our party system.

Public Support Essential

The members of the Congress and the President himself are imbued with a sense of accountability to their constituencies. Whether the President, in initiating and carrying out a foreign policy, or a member of the Congress, in voting assent and appropriating the substance for it, the political leaders of our Government must stay within the limits of public support.

I do not mean that the public must give an articulate assent to every action. I mean only that public understanding and affirmation set the limits within which actions can be taken, and any course in foreign policy which transcends those limits can be carried through only after thorough public debate and examination have brought about a widening of the limits within which public support can be elicited.

Debate on such matters in our channels of information and opinion—uncontrolled as they are—is a strenuous business. Our practice is that no doubt can be resolved until it has been aired.

Those who hear from afar the recurring mutterings of doubt and dissent in our forums should understand them as the echoes of a free people who take life seriously and are having to resolve their wills on questions of enormous importance growing out of drastic changes in the factors that bear on their lives.

The Shift from Historic Concepts

I shall try to focus my attention on my main objective—to interpret the conclusions and attitudes which enlighten American foreign policy as it relates to the pattern of coalitions and which mark the great shift from the concepts of American foreign policy in the historic past.

The first of these is the simple recognition that we can no longer stand apart from the concerns of power and the issues of war and peace.

Within one quarter of a century the equipoise of power upon which the United States had relied in the period of filling out its continental position broke down. Two world wars were fought. Enormous physical devastation and political disruption were the consequences.

In both instances of war a preponderant majority of the American people hoped to stay uninvolved, even though recognizing that their country had huge strategic stakes in the outcome.

In each instance their hopes were cheated by the course of events. Both times the American Nation entered the conflict much as a voluntary fireman might attend to his duties in a conflagration. The Americans regarded the occasion as the regrettable result of someone's carelessness or malevolence. They hoped—and they supported

the hope with great effort and sacrifice—that the blazes might soon be quenched so as to permit a resumption of the normal course of affairs, and they trusted that no one would ever be so foolish as to start another such fire.

The experience of reluctant involvement in two world wars led Americans into two lines of judgment on what had happened.

One line asked the question: "Would it not have been better to interpose our strength from the start so that the addition of American power as an active and immediate factor in the crucial world equation might have prevented the outbreak of war altogether or at least have brought the situation under control soon enough to have prevented such enormous damage on the world?"

The other was along the line of this question: "Since the result of the wars was so unsatisfactory, was it not a mistake to participate at all?"

Now let us suppose that we had stayed out of World War II. Suppose we had permitted the Nazis in their evilly dynamic way to subdue and then to organize the resources and positions which they sought as their dominion. Suppose then that the Nazis were ranged along the Eastern Atlantic with the weapons of atomic energy at their command and with the resources of Europe and the heartlands of the Eurasian land mass and Africa at their disposal. Suppose rampant Japan had been permitted, as an ally to the Nazis, to aggrandize its war potential by assimilating the resources of all Eastern Asia and all its offshore islands. Now obviously the situation of the United States would be vastly worse than the one it faces now. We should be confronted by an equivalent of the very situation which our policy now strives to prevent.

I think Americans have come preponderantly to understand the tragic necessity of participating in World War II and to accept the impossibility of ever again enjoying the exemptions of our earlier times.

They have come to understand that the United States would be in the front line of attack in any renewal of world war. This is made possible by the great advances in the techniques of attack—the speed and stealth with which attacks can be delivered and the range over which the blows can land. There is a general understanding that in evolving from the status of a reserve area in the world's power arrangements, we necessarily emerge in the position of a prime target. The same circumstances—our scope, our economic resources—as make it of primary importance to the adversary to try to isolate us in the cold war mean that he must try to bring his force to bear on us directly at the outset of a hot war.

The idea of imminent involvement in any war carries on inevitably to the conclusion of putting strength in the balance to prevent a war from occurring.

The second great element in American thinking

is the recognition that as of now and for the calculable future a universal organization is not alone an adequate, workable answer to the problem of maintaining the kind of peace that free institutions require.

• *Mr. Marshall is a member of the Policy Planning Staff, Department of State. The above article is taken from an address made before the NATO Defense College at Paris on Oct. 20 and 22.*

Secretary Acheson, M. Schuman Discuss Assembly Problems

Following is the text of a communiqué issued at New York on November 8 by the United States Mission to the United Nations after a meeting on that date between Secretary Acheson and French Foreign Minister Schuman.

Foreign Minister Robert Schuman and Secretary of State Dean Acheson discussed problems before the General Assembly, particularly the items dealing with Tunisia and Morocco. The two Ministers met on the basis of a long and close personal friendship. The Secretary took the opportunity to familiarize Mr. Schuman with the points of view which have come to his attention in his conversations with the heads of other delegations. Mr. Schuman stressed to Mr. Acheson the very strong views which are held by the French Government and people on the Tunisian and Moroccan questions. The discussion served to develop mutual understanding of the respective points of view of the French and United States Delegations.

General Eisenhower Invited to White House Conference

White House press release dated November 5

The President on November 5 sent the following telegram to Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower:

Thank you for your prompt and courteous reply to my telegram. I know you will agree with me that there ought to be an orderly transfer of the business of the Executive branch of the Government to the new Administration, particularly in view of the international dangers and problems that confront this country and the whole free world. I invite you, therefore, to meet with me here in the White House at your early convenience to discuss the problems of this transition period, so that it may be made clear to all the world that this Nation is united in its struggle for freedom and peace.¹

HARRY S. TRUMAN

¹ On Nov. 6 General Eisenhower telegraphed his acceptance of President Truman's suggestion and proposed that they meet the week of Nov. 17.

A United Nations Balance Sheet

by Howland H. Sargeant

Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs¹

As we all know, the United Nations has recently been on the receiving end of some criticism. It is called a windy, powerless, debating society. It is blamed for not having settled today's number one problem—the deep conflict between the Soviet Union and the free world. It is accused of futility. It is, we are told, a threat to the sovereignty of the United States. These are serious charges. They must be answered.

Let us go back to that time—7 years ago—when the United Nations was born. Most of you, I am sure, remember. Perhaps some of you were in San Francisco when the Charter was signed. It was breath-taking. Practically every race, every creed, in the world had participated in its drafting. The world was taking—most men believed—the first great step toward outlawing war forever.

Actually, of course, a great part of the world was then still at war—the most deadly, most destructive, bloodiest war in all history. But the end was in sight. And “Never again, please God” was a prayer that echoed in every honest heart.

To be sure, the problems facing the world were tremendous. But they did not seem insoluble. For the first time in the long history of mankind, the tools to solve them actually were available. We had only to put those tools to work and, with hard work and persistence, the job could be done.

Against the background of those bright hopes, the disillusionment that has set in for some people is not too difficult to understand. Those who expected miracles were doomed to disappointment when they found they would have to settle for less. That is only natural. The United Nations has not accomplished miracles.

It has not created that “one world”—a world in which all nations cooperate—that was the hope of so many at the close of World War II. It has not averted or even slackened the bitter Cold War

between the free nations and Communist totalitarianism.

It has not yet solved a number of pressing political problems. There is the thorny issue of self-determination for dependent peoples. There is the problem of Kashmir and other areas in dispute between members of the United Nations. There is the unrest in the Middle East—an unrest traceable to social and economic causes as well as to purely political ones. Some two-thirds of the human race continues to live in poverty. Disease, hunger, and illiteracy continue to plague millions upon millions of people. There are differences of opinion as to how areas now under trusteeship ought to progress toward greater control of their own affairs.

The problem of disarmament—and it is a very basic problem in today's world—is still a long way from solution. And it is all too evident that fighting is still going on in Korea.

All of these things that I have mentioned are problems in today's world. Some of them—like the question of self-determination—are slowly being worked out by the peoples immediately concerned. It is the United Nations business to give these peoples every opportunity to do so. But the United Nations cannot stand aloof if solutions are not reached. All problems which have a bearing on the peace and the stability of the world are—in the long run—the United Nations business.

To the extent that these problems continue to exist, I suppose you could look upon them as debits in the U.N. account. But it would be entirely unrealistic to blame the United Nations for the existence of debits that mankind has had on the books for generations. And it would be tragic if we were to allow these debits to destroy our faith in the United Nations.

The United Nations is that way. Korea was the test—it was a test and a challenge. The United Nations met both.

The Communists banked a lot on Korea. Just

¹ Excerpts from an address made at the University of Utah, Salt Lake City, on Oct. 23 (press release 827 dated Oct. 22).

how much has been clearly stated by the Communists themselves. This is what a Red army officer told Communist troops a few weeks before they launched the Korean aggression:

In order to successfully undertake the long-awaited world revolution we must first unify Asia . . . Java, Indochina, Malaya, Tibet, Thailand, the Philippines, and Japan are our ultimate targets . . . the United States is the only obstacle in our path . . . we must crush the United States.

Another Red officer declared—again I quote—“. . . the attack [on South Korea] marks the first step toward the liberation of Asia.” But the Communists’ “first step” failed because the United Nations acted.

The success of the U.N. action in Korea forced the Communists to request the opening of truce negotiations. The United Nations agreed to negotiate.

Sixteen months have gone by since those negotiations began. During that period, the patience of the U.N. negotiators has been sorely tried. The Communists have not been easy to work with. But the U.N. negotiators have not faltered in principle or purpose. And they have gotten results. Today, only a single issue—that of the prisoners of war—stands in the way of a decent armistice.

Some 3 weeks ago, the United Nations requested a temporary suspension of the negotiations. But that request was made only after the Reds had replied to a reasonable U.N. compromise offer on the one remaining issue with a torrent of abuse and distortion.

The U.N. negotiators have made it clear that they stand ready to resume negotiations whenever the Reds are willing to substitute constructive effort for obstruction and to abandon their practice of using the talks as a sounding board for propaganda. The United Nations has, however, made it clear that it will never agree to forcibly repatriate prisoners of war to the torture or the death that might await them in Communist hands. It is to be hoped that the Reds will come to their senses.

The results of the U.N. action in Korea go well beyond those we have already mentioned. The attack on the Republic of Korea unmasked the Communist purpose and alerted the free nations. To meet that danger, the free nations are building their collective security. The United Nations has reorganized its machinery for dealing with aggression. We should not overlook the success of the United Nations in confining hostilities to Korea and preventing a general war.

I am not, tonight, attempting to predict the final outcome of Korea. But this I do say. The halting of this aggression makes the world a safer place for all nations and all people who abide by the law. Maybe it is only a *little* safer, but the gain is there.

Had there been no United Nations, the Com-

munist program—so clearly stated by that North Korean officer—might well have succeeded. Indochina, Indonesia, Thailand, Burma, and Malaya today might be in the hands of the Communists. Their materials (and they are rich in materials), their manpower, might be added to the Communist strength. I used the word “might.” Perhaps I should have said “would.”

What would have stopped the Communists had Korea gone? Had the United Nations so failed its test, the other free, but weak, Asian nations would have had no recourse but to bow to their fate.

The free world has paid a heavy price for Korea. We, in this country, have paid a price. But we have gained much more than we have lost. We have taken a long step toward the objective we set ourselves in San Francisco—a world in which all aggression is outlawed and in which all nations, great and small, may live free from fear.

The Problem of Global Social Conditions

Recently the United Nations published the first report in history on social conditions prevailing over the globe. It is a lengthy report—400 pages. I would like to quote a paragraph:

. . . there has been spread among impoverished peoples of the world an awareness . . . heightened by modern communications and movements of men . . . that higher standards of living not only exist for others but are possible for themselves. Fatalistic resignation to poverty and disease is giving way to the demand for a better life. The demand is groping and uncertain in direction . . . but it is nonetheless a force that is establishing an irreversible trend in history.

From its inception the United Nations has recognized this trend. It has taken steps to help the world to find an answer to this demand.

The primary problem has to do with the life-and-death matter of food. Two-thirds of the world’s population are hungry. And as Prof. A. S. Bokhari, Pakistan’s permanent representative to the United Nations recently said: “A hungry man will choose four sandwiches instead of four freedoms.”

The U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) has tackled this problem. It seeks, of course, as many immediate results as possible, but the objective is a permanent rather than an emergency answer. World food production, says FAO, can be increased . . . 110 percent in the next 25 years. That is a staggering but not impossible task.

And it must be done. The truth is that if all available foods were evenly distributed, each of the 2 billion people in the world would have a little *less* to eat today than in the 5 prewar years. Says FAO: “It would seem that hunger is steadily haunting our civilization.”

FAO is seeking to produce the necessary additional food through (1) increased production, and

(2) prevention of waste. Both are essential and are feasible. We have the skills and means to do both.

When I say "we," I mean the peoples and nations of the world. No one nation and no one people could hope to accomplish the task alone. This is a job that demands our combined resources, our combined skills, and our combined energies. And that is the way the United Nations is handling it.

Take this little story. Three years or so ago, a popular magazine in the United States published an article about FAO which emphasized the importance of such simple things as the use of scythes instead of sickles, or even cruder implements. The article was noted in a number of countries, among them Austria, which before the war was famous for the production of small farm implements. It came, also, to the attention of the Government of Afghanistan.

Both countries turned to FAO. As a result, two Austrian experts, W. Faiss and R. Hartman, went to Afghanistan in a jeep carrying a varied supply of small agricultural tools. They joined the FAO mission in Kabul and under the direction of W. Sommerauer, a Swiss, went out into the countryside demonstrating the use of scythes, spades, forks, and so forth. They found the Afghan farmers eager to learn. And the results were so good that FAO is setting up a demonstration center in the area for improved farm tools.

In fighting waste, FAO is concentrating upon diseases of livestock. That is too broad a field to discuss at length here. I would like, however, to mention the rinderpest campaign in Thailand. Formerly, in periodic epidemics of this killer, Thailand lost from 75 to 90 percent of its cattle. Since the FAO campaign was launched 2 years ago, not a single case of rinderpest has been reported in the entire country.

Another example. Throughout recorded history, the locust has been a destroyer of food. The insects have just two urges: to get food and to breed. They recognize no national boundaries. They do not care about differences in politics. FAO has declared war on these "flying stomachs."

On another tack the FAO is hammering away at the job of arousing government and public interest in improved handling and storage of grain. "We are," says FAO, "fools if we let weevils and rats steal our food when it can be prevented." Actually, you know, it is comparatively easy to outwit weevils. The preventive is to dry the grain with artificial heat to a moisture content as low as 12 percent and provide storage facilities that will keep it dry. The weevil cannot break through the surface when the grain is dry and hard.

Costa Rica has followed FAO's advice and with technical assistance has reduced its losses from weevils substantially and, of course, increased the food supply for its people.

Hand in hand with its campaign to prevent

hunger goes the U.N. fight to preserve life and cure the sick. It is an uphill battle. A DDT campaign organized by the U.N. World Health Organization (WHO) has practically eliminated malaria from Italy, Brazil, and Ceylon. Yet 300 million people still continue to suffer from the disease and, of these, some 3 million die each year.

WHO is fighting yaws in the East. One U.N. doctor working in Java tells the story of Tumali, age 10. The child came to him with a foot so badly crippled by yaws that he could not walk. A shot of penicillin in the lad's little brown thigh was all that was needed. In a week the sores had disappeared.

WHO is fighting typhus in Afghanistan and polio throughout the world. It contained and stopped a cholera outbreak in Egypt.

The fight, again, is collective action. An Irish nurse is teaching Thai housewives to "scrub and scrub with soap and water" in maternity cases. A Canadian nurse is teaching elementary nursing in Formosa. A Danish woman doctor is instructing Bornean girls in scientific midwifery. An American physician is showing Iranians about scientific nutrition, and an Indian is doing the same job in Burma.

The United Nations recognizes that in each of these campaigns the real enemy is the low living standards of the people. Raise those standards, and hunger, disease, and ignorance would disappear. But hungry, sick, and ignorant people can't do much to help themselves. It is a vicious circle.

Technical Aid Projects and the Work of UNESCO

The United Nations, however, is not ignoring the need for action in this field. There are, for example, power projects with the United Nations helping out with technical aid. Let me tell you the story of a tractor firm in Yugoslavia. "We are producing about 600 tractors a year," said Stevan Buranji, the 29-year-old manager of the plant. "But we have to speed up. We have to make better machines."

Buranji appealed to the U.N. Technical Assistance Program. William Harrigan, an American engineer, made a survey of the plant. When he left 6 weeks later, Buranji had the information he needed. His factory is turning out more and better tractors. Not a *big* project, of course. Not to be mentioned, perhaps, in the same breath with some of those power projects, but to Buranji it was important. And to the farmers in his area it was vital. It meant a "lift" in the standards of living for all of them.

I would like to mention the community self-help projects inaugurated in Greece with technical assistance and advice from the United Nations. The program has the imposing title of "Community Development Employment for the Utilization of Idle Manpower." We will call it CDE for convenience. Under CDE, the local communities decide what they want and need to do and provide

almost all of the tools and equipment. The people contribute their services.

Most of the projects are for small villages or rural communities—roads, drainage, and the like. Patras, however, is a community of 100,000 persons. It is a big city, even by our standards. A few years ago, only about 10 percent of the homes in Patras had water and sewer connections. Today, the percentage is 75. All of the sewer mains were made from native rock and home-produced cement. No imported materials were used. With the water and sewer project well under way, Patras tackled its streets, sidewalks, parks, and squares.

Most of the work, remember, was done by the people. The United Nations supplied only technical assistance and inspiration. All of this work, you will note, is done not only on a cooperative basis but through the free consent of all the nations involved. That includes the nations receiving as well as those contributing help.

At the root of collective action is the will to achieve it. The creation and the strengthening of this will is the special assignment of one specialized agency of the United Nations—the Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, more popularly known as UNESCO. The Constitution of UNESCO states that its purpose is to “contribute to peace and security by promoting collaboration among the nations through education, science and culture.”

In this country, we have long held that education was a requisite of a united nation. Through UNESCO, that concept is being projected on a world scale. Jaime Torres Bodet, the Director General of the agency, has declared that a united world depends upon the elimination of “the most unjust of all frontiers—the frontier that divides those who can read and write from those who cannot.”

Here in this country the significance of being able to read and write is lost on us. We take it for granted. Long ago, we enacted laws compelling attendance at school and went on to other matters. Many of us would be surprised to know that the frontier mentioned by Mr. Torres Bodet is a current and grave problem in many lands.

The list of educational projects is long and varied. Each is a component of a comprehensive program aimed at clearing away barriers erected by ignorance and at lifting the level of understanding. In short, UNESCO is getting on with its job.

Charge of U.N. Violation of National Sovereignty

At this point, I would like to discuss the charge that the United Nations and its specialized agencies violate the sovereignty of the United States—that it is a threat to us as a nation. That charge ignores one of the fundamentals of the U.N. concept—that it must operate as a free society of sovereign nations. The independence and integrity of each member, great and small,

are respected. Not only respected but protected.

I challenge anyone to show me where the United Nations has violated the sovereign dignity of the United States. Or of any other law-abiding nation. It uses force only with the lawless. And then only to insist that they respect the rights of others. The majority of the U.N. members, for example, may not like the present political system in the U.S.S.R. But there is no thought of forcing any other system on that nation. It is only when the Soviet Union tries to force their system on us—any of us—that we object.

In a recent speech to the Communist Party Congress, Prime Minister Stalin told Communist parties and Communist-front organizations throughout the world to raise high “the banner of national independence and of national sovereignty.” Was Stalin telling the Communists abroad that they owed their allegiance to their home countries rather than to the Soviet Union? Nothing of the sort. Stalin was telling these Communists and fellow travelers to parade as genuine patriots so as to obscure their real intentions. He was telling them to hide their revolutionary aims by posing as champions of the sovereignty and stability of the nations within which they operate.

We may expect, therefore, an increase—in this country and others—of crocodile tears shed over the alleged surrenders by each nation of some part of its sovereignty to international agencies. We may expect trumpet calls to rally around the banners of economic isolationism. We may expect attempts to pass the counterfeit coinage of actual allegiance and subservience to the Kremlin as genuine patriotism.

This is not a new dodge. But it is one that we, here in America, must watch closely. We must examine very carefully the motives of those so-called super-patriots who constantly attack the United Nations on the ground that it is undermining our national sovereignty. We must be alert to those who wave the American flag even as they are fomenting division within our country and between America and her associates in the United Nations.

If we find that we are dealing with Communists or Communist-fronters, we can draw our own conclusions as to the validity of their arguments.

If, on the other hand, we find that the United Nations is being criticized by loyal Americans, we should accept that criticism in the spirit in which it is offered. And if the criticism is constructive, as much of it is, we must do what we can to help the United Nations in its efforts to correct the faults to which the criticism is directed.

But, above all, we must strengthen—not weaken—our support of the United Nations. The United Nations has justified and is justifying that support.

The United Nations applies to the U.S.S.R. the

system of manners imposed in the playgrounds by an old teacher I once knew. She used to tell her pupils, "Your right to swing your fist ends where Billy Jones' chin begins."

That is what we are saying to the Communists in Korea. We are saying it to the North Korean Communists, to the Chinese, and to the Russians. "All right," we tell them, "we do not like communism. You do, or think you do. That's your business. But when you try to push any of us around it is another matter. Where our chins begin is the place where you can pull back your fist."

My old teacher's playground was orderly. The smaller children were not bullied. We all had more fun and got along better because of her rule.

That is the kind of world we want. It is the kind the United Nations is building. And, despite some of the debits on the ledger, it has gone a long way toward reaching its goal.

Yes, to be sure there is talk in the U.N. Council. But that talk is better than bullets.

And the United Nations hasn't, I admit, settled the question of the Soviet's drive for world domination. But it has stopped the Soviets in their well-planned and well-organized campaign. It has given the free nations time to build their security.

And it has given the world hope that some day the dream of those men and women of San Francisco—a world in which war is forever outlawed and lasting peace abides—will be realized.

The Application of Point Four in El Salvador

*by Angier Biddle Duke
Ambassador to El Salvador¹*

My experience has been in the Spanish-speaking world and so I will confine my observations on the execution of [U.S. foreign] policy to Latin America in general, and Central America in particular, with the accent on El Salvador.

Broadly speaking our major objectives in the Western Hemisphere have been defined by Secretary Acheson as the security of our Nation and our neighbors; the encouragement of democratic representative institutions; and the positive co-operation in the economic field to help in the attainment of those first two goals. If those then are our aims, then in their fulfillment the Secretary of State outlined for our guidance certain basic principles on which the development of our policy has rested and will rest. They are:

Our essential faith in the value of the individual;

The juridical equality of all the American Republics;

The preservation of our way of life without attempting to impose it upon others;

The perfection of an inter-American system for the maintenance of international peace;

Protection of the legitimate interests of our people and Government, together with respect for the legitimate interests of all the other peoples and governments;

Nonintervention in the internal or external affairs of any American nation; and

The promotion of the economic, social, and political welfare of the people of the Americas.

Call this policy by any name you will, but it is the long-range program of our country; an historic, bipartisan, truly national policy, perhaps as much the concept of President Hoover and Secretary Stimson as it was of Franklin Roosevelt and Cordell Hull.

Removed from the arena of the Great Debate, today this policy is working, and working far better than many have any idea. It is the reverses, the set-backs we hear about so frequently perhaps, and thus we may be inclined to feel the fault lies with our Government—not taking into account that the responsibility for good relations is a mutual obligation between two governments, not a unilateral one on our part. Just because we have good neighbors in the Americas and not satellites does not mean that we do not have the right to expect scrupulous reciprocity from these countries in regard to our legitimate rights and interests. Our size, our wealth, our ability, our generosity, and above all our restraint in the exercise of our power, must not be mistaken for one who is purposeless or soft.

Within the framework of these ideas let me explore with you the application of our objectives and principles to the relationship of the United States of America with a neighbor whose dimensions are roughly 50 miles wide and 200 miles long. The nation to which I am accredited is a most independent state wherein is reproduced a scale model of just about all the problems that confront many contemporary countries regardless of size. The familiar problems of taxation, of communism, and Presidential elections can be as absorbing in one degree or another in El Salvador as they are elsewhere. In addition, something new has been added; I have two other factors to worry about personally which did not exist in Argentina or Spain, my previous posts—earthquakes and the Point Four Program. As they usually seem to happen at night, I stay in bed resignedly for the first of these, but as I am responsible for the administration of the second, I am fast becoming used to carrying out what Adlai Stevenson calls "diplomacy in overalls." I think that old query "Just what is Point Four, anyway?" is largely dying down, and I would not presume to inflict

¹ Excerpts from an address made at Duke U., Durham, N.C., on Oct. 24 (press release 834 dated Oct. 23).

upon this high I. Q. group today one more interpretation. But there are a few observations I would like to make which I feel are pertinent.

You will remember President Truman's statement in April of this year:

Mass suffering has been used by every dictatorship of our times as a stepping stone to power. . . . To have peace we must strike at the conditions of misery that envelop half the people of the earth. This is the purpose and meaning of Point Four.²

The concern of the President is not just humanitarianism, although that element must be present in the foreign policy of a democracy. But that does not mean that it is a policy of simple charity. Most emphatically not. We are out giving a helping hand to people because in so doing we are giving strength to associates in our common struggle for survival. We have embraced this realistic policy of enlightened self-interest because we know very well that we cannot stand alone in this world—we dare not stand alone. Point Four then, as an instrument of national policy, is a happy combination of genuine idealism and a means of strengthening the non-Communist world to the end that it will be able to withstand the physical pressure and the political penetration of our enemies. This is the dynamic Program designed to fill the vacuum created by inadequate and negative doctrines of mere anticommunism.

Now let us take a look at how technical assistance works out in El Salvador. I wish I could take you all there in person for I know you would love that place and its friendly people. It is a little gem of a country where I find my work rewarding, important, and absorbing.

The difficulties they have to overcome are immense, but they are attacking them courageously, intelligently, and in large part successfully; and the United States is not indifferent to their efforts.

The responsibility for Point Four there, as I have said, is placed upon the Ambassador who, assisted by a director of technical cooperation, coordinates the work of our three technical missions in agriculture, in health and sanitation, and in fisheries. One more mission is to be established—in education; and we also are assisting the Salvadoran Government with the services of an American economist.

The point to bear in mind about the work of each technical mission is the fact that our organization is not there to do the job for the Salvadorans but to train them to do it themselves.

The Principal Problem in El Salvador

To understand the principal problem of this fascinating country, you may picture to yourselves the rich agricultural State of Kansas with its nearly 2,000,000 population. Now think of the lush, tropical agricultural nation of El Salvador with about the same population as Kansas and

only one-tenth of its area! Not more than half of even this small area is completely tillable, for this Central American nation is a land of mighty mountains and volcanoes, of rivers and coastal swamps, as well as of rich, fertile soil in its farm lands. Imagine how agriculture must be made more and more scientifically productive in order to support this population.

Coffee is the backbone of the state economy, and last year this country was outranked in the world only by Brazil and Colombia in the production of coffee. Last year El Salvador exported nearly 86 million dollars worth of produce, mostly coffee, while at the same time the value of its imports came to 64 million dollars in goods, of which 40 million dollars went for goods bought from the United States. The whole foundation of the nation's social progress depends mainly on the sale of that wonderful bean without which no American breakfast is a success.

Our agricultural mission offers the clearest example there of the possibilities of the Program. The Government of El Salvador has set up two large agricultural stations, largely at their own expense, to which we contribute the services of nine of our technicians who are engaged in training hundreds of Salvadorans in a research and technical program aimed at increasing the production of food for home consumption, export crops, and above all, coffee.

These binational centers are carrying their training program and research results directly to more farmers than otherwise would be possible through a national extension service to educate them to better management practices, cultivation methods, soil-conservation practices, and to bring to them information on fertilizers, new seeds, and insecticides.³

Point Four is also particularly active in the field covered by the public-health mission. The Salvadoran Government has allocated funds to build, staff, and maintain clinics, hospitals, and sanitary centers with our help and advice. Incidentally, we have a young American architectural engineer on the staff whose creativeness is very refreshing in the realm of functional design. Very often such a utility structure as a pump house for a town water-supply system will be the most attractive local building. The pride of the inhabitants in its appearance often has the useful effect of insuring their loving care and attention to the building's maintenance and upkeep.

To say the country needs more doctors would be quite an understatement, but El Salvador is fortunate in the high caliber of its medical profession. Many doctors receive training in the United States, many of them under Point Four grants. The health level of the nation is rising. Life in that part of Central America today bears little

² For an article on agricultural extension work in El Salvador, see *Field Reporter* for July-August 1952, Department of State publication 4574, p. 31.

³ BULLETIN of Apr. 21, 1952, p. 607.

relationship to the stories of fever-ridden jungles that we may have read about years ago.

Technical Cooperation in the Maritime Field

One of the more colorful aspects of the Program is that of the third mission—fisheries.

Oddly enough, El Salvador has not heretofore made any serious effort to exploit the maritime wealth which may exist on her Pacific Ocean doorstep. Fish is important as a cheap protein food, which is badly needed to augment the diet of the mass of the population there.

Now obviously it is logical that the country should develop the demand for fish among its people, both from the standpoint of health and on behalf of the national economy. And that is where our technical cooperation comes in.

At their request, we lent the country an expert from the Fish and Wildlife Service who advised them on the purchase of a boat in San Pedro, Calif. It has an American captain, an American mate, and a Salvadoran crew who are fishing the coastal waters and finding out just what there is to be had in the way of sea life. If they come to the conclusion that there is the proper quantity and variety of fish, then private capital has indicated it will promptly establish a local fishing industry. At present, the catches are being given away by the Government to hospitals and schools. People are eating fish they probably seldom, if ever, tasted before. So we hope that before long a whole new area of nutrition will be opened for the people of El Salvador and a profitable new private industry established.

I mentioned a moment ago that many Salvadoran doctors had received their training in the United States. This is true not only in the profession of medicine but in other fields as well. The State Department is making it possible for many students and leaders of Central America and other areas to come to the United States to learn the latest American techniques for better living and, incidentally, to get a good close-up view of life in the United States. In this connection, it has been our experience that one of the best ways to make friends in foreign nations is to have as many of their nationals as possible come here to take a searching look at how we do things here. Almost without exception, they come to appreciate our way of living and seek to interpret it when they return to their native lands.

The Government of El Salvador faces the problem of a high percentage of illiteracy among its people and therefore it has already attacked the situation with vigor. Our projected Point Four mission in education is scheduled to be of assistance in the vocational field. We are already giving aid to that Government in organizing an industrial trade school and plan to assist it in

further development of a national school of agriculture.

In these days wherein we are increasingly concerned with the high cost of government, you will find it refreshing to note that the ratio of cost to the United States in the Point Four operation is constantly going down. When we started out in El Salvador 10 years ago, we split the cost of Point Four 50-50 between the two Governments; now the host Government is contributing about five dollars to every one of ours. There is also the matter of specialists; we have 20 Americans operating the Program with several hundred Salvadorans. As time goes on, it is expected that the U.S. ratio in both dollars and men will constantly be reduced as their technical and economic progress really takes hold. This is a self-satisfying work that is being done which does not at all infringe upon the sovereignty of El Salvador—indeed it strengthens it—and which can in no way lessen the self-respect of a proud and hard-working people.

There are many other phases of our Program down there and I have touched only the high lights. But that, I believe, gives you a pretty fair picture of how busy we are in one small country in carrying out our part in a world-wide attack against conditions of ignorance and squalor and in assisting our friends in making their democracy stronger and stronger.

One note of caution against overoptimism: many of the problems our two Governments face there are complex and to these there are no easy solutions. The United States can only contribute partially to the solution of their economic problems—the destiny of El Salvador is in its own hands.

As a corollary to the actual technical assistance we are giving the country, I am keenly interested in an information program whereby the Salvadorans of every level come to value our economic cooperation. I want the work we are doing to have a meaning to them so that they appreciate not only our practical help but come to know what is behind it—to have a sympathy for us as a people, for our kind of government, and for our economic system.

What we are doing must be recognized as the stamp of a system which offers hope for a better life, real practical hope. Democracy as a symbol of hope must be made manifest by accomplishments to draw to it the faith of the unlettered and the underprivileged. Our dynamic democracy is accomplishing things, getting things done which show more and more that in our beliefs there is practical, true hope for a progress that becomes a new reality every day—giving the lie to the empty doctrines of those who promise light when there is only darkness in their plans.

Achievements of Public and Private Investment in Underdeveloped Areas

Statement by Isador Lubin

U.S. Representative to the General Assembly¹

U.S./U.N. press release dated Oct. 29

It is all too easy to agree that poverty, disease, and ignorance are the enemies which mankind must eliminate. It is equally easy to agree that social and economic progress are desirable objectives. What is difficult, what requires thought, energy, and effort is doing something to achieve these objectives.

It is this difficult task—the achievement of social and economic progress—that we have set for ourselves in the United Nations and the specialized agencies. By common consent, we have set it at the forefront of our discussions and actions, in the Economic and Social Council, in the Regional Economic Commissions, and in this Committee. Great effort and much time have been devoted to determining the basic elements of the problem and to exploring ways and means of dealing with them.

The results of our efforts have taken concrete form in the work and accomplishments of the technical-assistance programs of the United Nations and the specialized agencies, the International Bank, the Colombo Plan, our own U.S. Point Four Program, and various other cooperative programs for the economic and social advancement of the less developed countries.

Altogether, as we assess our combined experiences, we find we have made important strides. But it is patently clear that we still have a great distance to go. The problem of assisting the less developed countries will be with us for a long time. It will be a continuing problem, one which will give rise to continuing responsibilities on the part of every member of the U.N. community.

This task of helping people to help themselves is one to which the American people have long subscribed. As a Nation, we are convinced that security and progress must be the essential aim of all members of the United Nations. We in the United States are convinced that we cannot achieve the kind of security and progress which we seek

for ourselves while a large part of the people of the world are—if I may use the words of President Roosevelt—ill-housed, ill-clothed and ill-fed.

It is because of this conviction, Mr. Chairman, that we in the United States have supported—and will continue to support—the social and economic advancement of the less developed areas through practical action on a bilateral basis, through the United Nations, and through the specialized agencies.

The widespread and urgent need of the less developed areas for basic facilities in such fields as transportation, power, communications, education, and public health has been continually emphasized in the discussions of every U.N. agency. There can be little disagreement with this emphasis. These are the foundations on which the advance toward higher standards of living must in large part rest. The job of creating those basic facilities is one which countries are understandably impatient to get done. Yet, we must not permit ourselves to forget that, because of the very nature of these basic facilities, it often takes a considerable period of time to bring them into existence. Additions to basic assets are generally large-scale and at times massive undertakings. They involve the preparation of detailed plans, the assembling of supervisory staff and skilled workers, the solution of problems of financing, and the procurement of capital equipment. All of this takes skill, patience, and time. Moreover, once such projects are completed, time must elapse before they can play their full role in the local economy.

Clearly, despite the importance of financing economic development, it does not always constitute the crux of the problem. In fact, our experts in the field of water use and reclamation, who have made a world-wide study of current plans and projects, conclude that the limiting factor is not finance but trained technicians. They tell us that there are now available less than 25 percent of the total number of scientists and engineers needed to harness unused water resources at the rate required

¹ Made in Committee II (Economic and Financial) on Oct. 30.

to raise living standards and keep up with population growth.

Certainly, no one would deny that there are important problems of financing still to be resolved, among them the broad place of the United Nations in any practical scheme of making funds available for financing economic development. As to further action in this field, we must await results of the various decisions taken by the Economic and Social Council in its last session.²

Effectiveness of Present Efforts Weighed

In the face of all of our efforts in the field of economic development, the question is often raised: Is anything really significant happening? Is the ground for the achievement of better standards of living actually being laid in the less developed countries? Or, are we, in our debates on this matter, simply talking of dreams?

After 7 years it might be well to take stock of what has been done in this vital area. What has been accomplished in terms of the funds expended? How have our efforts been reflected in dams built, electric generating capacity installed, acreage cleared, drained, and irrigated, transportation facilities built?

It is unfortunate that data which would enable us to measure what has been happening in these fields are not conveniently available. Indeed, we even lack comprehensive and authoritative figures on the total amount of funds—external and domestic—that have been invested in the less developed areas. We hope that the answers to the most recent questionnaire circulated by the Secretary-General under the full-employment resolution of Ecosoc will give us more concrete facts on which to base our future discussions.

Such data as are at hand on external investment show that in 1951, a total of approximately 2 billion dollars of new external capital was made available for economic and social development in the less developed countries by private investors, the International Bank, and Governmental institutions.

Over the past 7 years the Government of the United States has provided almost 6 billion dollars in the form of loans or grants directly to countries in these areas. This does not include our paid-in subscription of 635 million dollars to the International Bank, all of which has been available to the Bank for lending purposes. Nor does it include the contributions which we have made to the United Nations and the specialized agencies—all of which have directly and indirectly assisted in the improvement of economic and social conditions in these areas.

Within the last 16 months the U.S. Export-Import Bank has approved over 200 million dollars of loans to less developed countries. This

has brought the total of its loans to these areas to date to over 2½ billion dollars.

The funds provided by the International Bank are equally significant. Between July 1951 and October of this year it made loans exceeding 250 million dollars for projects in 13 underdeveloped countries. The total of International Bank's loans to such countries has aggregated over 600 million dollars.

In order that we may continue our bilateral program of grant assistance to agriculture and industry in these areas, the Congress of the United States has authorized an appropriation of 460 million dollars for the current fiscal year alone.

These figures, of course, only sketch the great amount of effort and resources that have been going into economic development. To them should be added approximately 2 billion dollars that was invested by the European metropolitan governments, in the past 5 years, in their dependent overseas territories.

And it should be emphasized that none of these figures include the very large amounts that the less developed countries themselves have invested from their own domestic resources. Although no authoritative data are available, it would be logical to assume that the total of such domestic investment has been even greater than the figures I have just cited.

Significant as these figures are, they do not, however, tell the dramatic story that often lies behind them—the story of the harnessing of great rivers, the creation of new farm areas and new industrial areas where before there had been only wilderness, the story of the building of highways and railroads through previously unbroken country.

Even though we have no comprehensive worldwide picture of the scale of accomplishment in the field of economic development, there are nevertheless sufficient scattered facts to show some of the results of the investments made, of the loans and the grants that have been extended, of the services of the experts that have been made available, and of the efforts of the less developed peoples themselves.

Growth in Production

According to Raoul Prebisch, the Executive Secretary of the Economic Commission for Latin America, the gross product *per capita*, for all of Latin America, in the 5-year period 1946–50, increased at the rate of 3.5 percent annually. This compares with an annual growth of only 1.4 percent in the preceding 5-year period. Unfortunately, similar data are not available for other less developed areas.

Among other data available to us are the figures on the growth of the generation and distribution of electricity. What has been the story here? According to figures of the U.N. Secretariat, the pro-

² For a review by Mr. Lubin of Ecosoc's 14th session, see BULLETIN of Aug. 25, 1952, p. 288.

duction of electricity more than tripled in the less developed countries between 1929 and 1950. It rose from about 41 billion kw.-hrs. in 1929 to over 130 billion kw.-hrs. in 1950. This increase of 89 billion kw.-hrs. is six times the total power production of the 36 plants of the Tennessee Valley Authority in 1951.

If one looks at specific countries, one finds that in India, the production of electricity totaled 345 million kw.-hrs. per month in 1947, 425 million in 1950, and 514 million in May of 1952. In Mexico, the monthly figure rose from 207 million in 1937 to 369 million in 1950 and to 450 million in May of the current year. In the Philippines, monthly production increased from about 11 million in 1937 to 30 million in 1948, and to over 47 million in July 1952. In Brazil, monthly production increased from 85 million kw.-hrs. a month in 1937 to 204 million in 1948 and to 266 million last June.

The same story of progress is reflected in the statistics of cement production. In 1937 Venezuela produced less than 4,000 metric tons of cement a month. In 1948 the monthly output was 18,000 tons. In May 1952 it was over 73,000. A program is under way to expand this capacity by an additional 395,000 tons annually. Brazil produced about 48,000 tons of cement a month in 1937, 92,000 tons a month in 1948, and over 130,000 in December 1951.

Similar trends can be cited for iron and steel. In 1946 the average monthly production of crude steel in Chile was less than 2,000 metric tons. Production in May 1952 was over 20,000 tons. A program of expansion begun in 1951 is designed to increase this capacity to 280,000 tons annually. At the same time it is planned to increase the annual capacity of finished steel products from 185,000 to 214,000 tons. In Mexico, monthly crude-steel production rose from 22,000 metric tons in 1948 to over 64,000 in January 1952. In 1937 India produced 78,000 tons of steel a month. In 1948 her monthly output was 106,000 tons. In January of this year production exceeded 140,000 tons.

So much for the over-all picture as revealed by the available statistics. Now let us look at some of the specific projects that promise even greater progress in the future.

Specific Projects

In the Philippines the National Power Corporation has begun the construction of a dam and reservoir near the Agno headwaters. It proposes initially to install a generating capacity of 75,000 kws. This will serve the growing demands of the Manila area. The project will also provide electrical energy for industrial operations around Baguio, as well as flood control and irrigation for large areas in the heavily populated central portion of Luzon Island. It is being financed in part by a 20-million-dollar loan from the Export-Import Bank.

In Ceylon, the Government has recently undertaken a combined hydroelectric, irrigation, and jungle-clearing project on the eastern part of the island. It involves the irrigation of over 100,000 acres of land. It also involves the installation of a 25,000-kw. hydroelectric power station. The dam upon which this whole scheme depends was completed in 1951. Construction of irrigation canals and the clearing of jungles by modern machinery is proceeding rapidly. It is expected that some 200,000 people will be settled in the area over a 10-year period. Some of these colonists are already on their new landholdings. Of the anticipated 200,000, about half will consist of small holders and their families. Thus far, this project has been financed entirely out of domestic resources.

In Pakistan, the main work on the Thal irrigation scheme, which will irrigate 1½ million acres, has been finished. The Lower Sind Barrage scheme is in an advanced stage and its first phase is scheduled for completion by the end of 1953. A number of new hydroelectric power projects will soon come into operation, and a group of new textile and other factories will be in production in 1952-53.

In Latin America, as a result of the efforts of the Colombian Government, the different sections of Colombia are literally being brought together. Until recently, the Colombian railroad system consisted of an eastern and a western network. There was nothing to connect them except the Magdalena River, which often ran dry. This, of course, meant serious shipping delays, heavy transshipment costs, and other assessments. Now, assisted by a 25 million-dollar loan by the International Bank, a 235-mile railroad link is to be built in the Magdalena River Valley, thus bringing together the country's eastern and western rail nets. Railroad and repair shops will be built in Bogotá. This construction will, of course, take time. By 1956, a modern, all-rail transportation system will have been established between Colombia's Pacific port of Buenaventura and the areas of Bogotá and Medellín. There will also have been established a fast and reliable rail-river route between central Colombia and her Caribbean ports. The country will have been joined together.

In Iraq, 80 percent of the people depend for their livelihood on agriculture. The full development of Iraq's agricultural potential depends on irrigation, and irrigation in turn depends on the control of the country's principal rivers—the Tigris, the Euphrates, and their tributaries.

To cope with this, Iraq's Irrigation Development Commission has drawn up plans for a comprehensive system of flood control and irrigation. In June of 1950, the International Bank loaned Iraq 12,800,000 dollars to finance her Tigris River flood-control project. A smaller project for the

control of the Euphrates River is being financed from Iraq's own resources. These, together with several smaller projects included in the over-all plan, will eliminate the frequent and often disastrous flooding of Iraq's two main rivers. They will also bring under irrigation a total of 9 million acres of land which will become an important factor in the Iraqi land-reform program.

In Mexico, President Alemán's regime initiated a 6-year program to put 2½ million acres of land under irrigation. Since 1946 Mexico has allotted about 10 percent of its budget for irrigation projects—a percentage unequalled by any other country in the world. With justifiable pride, the Mexican Government has pointed out that the work to be accomplished under this plan will be greater than that completed in the United States during the first 25 years of our own Bureau of Reclamation—the Federal agency that is concerned with similar land-development problems.

In Thailand, one of the world's largest dredging projects, and certainly the largest ever undertaken in Asia, is well under way near the entrance to Bangkok, Thailand's largest port. Here, the bar at the mouth of the river port has prevented the entry of large vessels. Lighters must carry cargoes from oceangoing vessels across the bar into the harbor. This has increased freight costs and interfered with foreign-trade expansion. To overcome this, funds were appropriated from the National Budget and loans were obtained from the International Bank. Dredging began in 1951. It is expected that the work will be finished by April 1953. Completion of the project will open a new era in trade for the port of Bangkok, and for Thailand generally.

In Brazil, a highway 400 kilometers long was recently completed between São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro in Brazil. This new road has cut the average travel time between these two important cities from 11 to 6 hours. Trucking rates have been reduced by almost 50 percent and a regular passenger bus service has been established for the first time.

Relation Between Public and Private Investment

These are only random examples of what is going on in the less developed countries to increase production and raise living standards. A complete accounting would take hours. And I might point out that these projects are being undertaken and completed at a time when the free nations of the world have had to devote so large a proportion of their resources to their defense.

Mr. Chairman, thus far I have been discussing "basic" economic development—the type of development that often involves projects which, at least in their early stages, are not self-liquidating. For this reason, and because of the fundamental role which they play in the economy, projects in these areas are increasingly being considered as a

field for large public investment in practically all countries. They have become more and more the concern of governments and intergovernmental financial institutions.

Clearly, so long as the problem of building essential basic facilities in underdeveloped areas remains so important, we must continue to be concerned with the problems of public financing. But, basic and necessary though they may be, projects undertaken by governments can only be one part of the development picture in a society which does not wish to subject itself completely to governmental controls. At best they can supply only the ground work and the frame for the real development which will bring the benefits which the people seek.

Investment in Point Four Countries

In order to develop private capital investment in Point Four countries, the Department announced November 5 (press release 860) that the following airgram has been sent to U.S. missions concerned:

It has become increasingly clear that the success of our Point Four efforts in underdeveloped countries depends in large measure upon increased investments of private capital from the United States, other capital exporting countries, and from local sources.

There is agreement in the executive branch that a considerable part of our total effort in the Point Four Program must be directed to this end.

The investment of private funds from capital exporting countries, particularly from the United States, has the added advantage in most cases of providing managerial and technical know-how to industrial development and will favorably affect the world dollar situation.

The Congress has recently reemphasized its interest in efforts to make wider use of private enterprise in the foreign-assistance program, and the Director of Mutual Security has asked all agencies concerned to cooperate in an intensified program.

The Technical Cooperation Administration and the Department of Commerce will pool their resources to carry out a joint program. . . .

In the field, the mission, working with the host government, local business groups, and individual businessmen, will be responsible for identifying and developing specific information on opportunities for investment, assisting in supplying background information, and in carrying out negotiations with the host government in an attempt to make the investment climate more attractive.

To carry out this program it is suggested that all officials of the mission, including Point Four staffs, should be instructed to keep in mind constantly the desirability of encouraging private participation in developmental activities of all kinds. . . .

All means of furthering private enterprise through jointly agreed technical-assistance projects should be explored. Of particular long-range importance are projects designed to facilitate private investment through advice in such fields as government fiscal policies and administration, tax laws, mining and corporation laws, etc., and through advice and possibly joint action with respect to improvement of credit facilities and establishing and strengthening of institutions directed at channeling private capital into approved development enterprises.

In and of themselves, neither vast irrigation and power systems nor elaborate highway or railway networks will improve the standard of living. They will not produce the clothes, food, and the housing required to provide a more decent living. It is only as these facilities permit and encourage innumerable individual efforts that an increasing volume of goods and services can be created for the consumer.

If the peoples of the less developed countries are to derive the maximum advantages from these facilities, we must think of the problem of economic development as something more than the problem of implementing governmental investment programs. We must think of it, rather, as a problem of focusing all the creative forces of society on the increase in the volume of productive activity and on the output of those commodities—shoes, houses, refrigerators, and the countless other things which go to raise living standards.

Of course, each country must decide for itself what it is willing to do about its economic development. Of course, each country must decide what institutions it will employ to bring about the production of the things its people want. In the United States, our accepted policy has been to develop our economy through private enterprise. We are convinced that the results have justified this policy.

Where governments desire to further economic activity through private investment, they must decide whether they are prepared to establish the conditions necessary for such investment. Foreign private enterprise will play its part wherever countries indicate that they are prepared to encourage it.

Despite the fact that the outflow of private investment to the less developed areas, in recent years, has been small in relation to need, the fact remains that direct investment from the United States reached a record total in 1951. On the basis of available statistics it seems headed for an even larger total this year. In the 18 months which ended on June 30, 1952, the flow of American direct investment to less developed areas amounted to almost 1 billion dollars.

Moreover, the available data show that the distribution of this new investment is more diversified than in the years immediately after the war. Whereas in the early postwar years the bulk of private investment went into extractive industry, the recent trend has been for such investment to go into manufacturing and distribution. Between the end of 1949 and 1951 American investment in manufacturing and distribution in the underdeveloped countries rose by about 525 million dollars, as compared with an increase of about 325 million dollars in petroleum.

There is still considerable hesitation on the part of private investors to send their capital abroad. But, as the record will show, their funds are flow-

ing abroad to areas where it is met with cooperation and sympathetic treatment.

Free Enterprise Contributions to Growth

Mr. Chairman, I want to say in all frankness that we in the United States recognize that there have been occasions when some American businesses have operated abroad in a manner which led them to be looked upon with suspicion. But, I want to say with equal frankness that such practices find no encouragement or support in the U.S. Government or the American people.

The records of our debates are replete with statements about the adequacy or inadequacy of private investment. These statements, however, for the most part, have been of a general nature. It might be well to examine specific instances of what is actually being done through private investment to assist in the growth and give vitality to the economies of underdeveloped countries throughout the world. With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I shall cite a few of these instances.

Let me first take the case of the Grace Company at Paramonga in Peru.

New Peruvian Paper Industry—When Grace first came to Paramonga all it had was a run-down sugar mill and surrounding cane fields. The company rehabilitated the cane fields by fertilization. It modernized the factory by installing new processes. It developed new techniques. It developed new crops. As a result, Paramonga is today a thriving town of 10,000 people, with their own markets, library, schools, swimming pool, theater, and hospital.

Nor does the community live by sugar refining alone. New industries have been established. By developing a process for making paper from bagasse, a byproduct of sugar refining, the company built a paper industry. With this came a chemical industry which manufactures caustic soda, chlorine, and muriatic acid. Initially, all of this was done through capital supplied by Grace. Further expansion was financed by the plowing back of profits year after year.

Of the 4,200 workers now employed, only four are U.S. citizens in permanent residence. Training is being provided in various branches of engineering, and skilled labor is being made available for other segments of Peru's growing industrial economy. At the same time Peru—which formerly had to import almost 100 percent of her paper—now can export paper.

New Factory Techniques in Ceylon—But private enterprise does more than bring capital and modern productive facilities into the less developed countries. It also brings techniques and know-how.

A case in point is the work of the Singer Sewing Machine Company in Ceylon. Without cost to the local owners, Singer has agreed to supply the necessary techniques for setting up a shirt factory. It is providing experts to advise on factory build-

ing, lay-outs, and flow charts. It is helping to train the employees of the new factory.

Parts Manufacturing Introduced—Wherever possible, American firms manufacturing complex machinery or equipment for sale in underdeveloped areas are increasingly moving the actual manufacturing of parts into these countries. It has been the practice of companies like General Motors and International Harvester to open sales agencies abroad which merely sold their U.S.-made products. In more recent years they have built assembly plants where parts manufactured in the United States were assembled for the local market. Now increasing numbers of these parts are being manufactured locally. International Harvester is now in the process of completing a plant in Santo Andre, Brazil. Here the most modern techniques for the manufacture of parts, as well as the assembly, of farm equipment, tractors, and trucks will be employed. A similar plant has been built at Saltillo, Mex.

Local Capital Mobilized—Possibly even more significant to the stimulation of economic development than the contribution of capital and technical know-how is the contribution that foreign private enterprise is often able to make in the mobilization of indigenous capital. Experience has shown that, in many cases, indigenous investors, who previously had been unwilling to participate in productive domestic industries, have been willing to do so in partnership with successful foreign companies.

Such has been the case of the C.O.I.A. Enterprise in Chile. The company manufactures paint and edible oils and refines sugar. Originally, these industries were established entirely at the initiative and with the capital of the Grace Company. As the enterprises have become firmly established and profitable, their stock is gradually being sold to local investors.

In India, the American Cyanamid Company recently formed with domestic interests a joint enterprise, known as Atul Limited. The factory they are establishing in Bulsar, India, will produce Aureomycin and other pharmaceutical products as well as dyestuffs and sulfur. Although the American company holds only 10 percent of the capital stock, it is contributing all its newest techniques and patents. It is also training Indian engineers in the United States to take over the operation of the plant. Eventually, there will only be one American actually at work at the factory.

New Local Industries Stimulated—Private foreign investment also often encourages the creation of new local industries which supply goods or services required by the foreign enterprise.

An interesting example in this connection is the experience of International General Electric in Mexico. The Company manufactures radio and television sets. In order to meet its cabinet needs it made an agreement with Industria

Mueblera, S.A. under which General Electric supplied loan capital and undertook certain other obligations. It trained the employees of Industria Mueblera in mass-production methods and quality specifications. The Mexican company has, on this basis, been able to expand its annual production from 10,000 cabinets in 1948 to 45,000 in 1951. It is still expanding. I understand that the Mexican company has now begun exporting furniture to the United States.

Greater Employee Earning Power—Another contribution of foreign capital is its work in training and teaching the people it employs, thus raising their earning power and living standards. A typical example of this is the program of the Creole Petroleum Company in Venezuela. When Creole began its operations, it discovered that although its workers were extremely eager and intelligent, the high degree of their illiteracy kept them from being promoted to the skilled jobs. Accordingly the Company, in cooperation with the Venezuelan Government, provided educational facilities for its workers. In 9 years the illiteracy rate among its employees fell from 82 to 12 percent. Workers who a relatively short time ago were holding unskilled jobs are today in supervisory positions.

These, then, are but few of the ways in which private foreign investment can and does help to further economic development. It is potentially able to provide large amounts of capital. It provides know-how techniques, skill, and the managerial experience required to start new industries.

It mobilizes domestic funds. It is inducing people in the less developed countries who formerly invested their money in jewels, gold, or real estate to put their savings into their own productive enterprises which directly contribute to a rise in living standards.

It stimulates the creation of new industries which are ancillary or related to the original enterprise.

It often provides the education and the housing, the sanitation, and many of the social amenities which are basic to the growing welfare of people.

The Sears, Roebuck Story—If I may, Mr. Chairman, I would like to conclude this discussion of the work of American private enterprise in the less developed countries by referring to one more firm—Sears, Roebuck and Company. Sears, as you may be aware, is one of the largest distributors of general merchandise in the world.

Sears began its overseas operations by opening its first store in Havana in 1941. Today, it operates 20 stores in Latin America—in Mexico, Cuba, Venezuela, and Brazil. The twenty-first is to be an 800-thousand-dollar air-conditioned building in Barranquilla, Colombia.

In 1947 when Sears opened its store in Mexico City, 90 percent of the merchandise it sold was made in the United States. Shortly afterward, the Company contracted with a Mexican manu-

facturer of refrigerators to produce the Company's standard model. This process has been repeated all along the line. On the basis of contracts whereby Sears agrees to purchase their products, Mexican manufacturers have expanded or set up new businesses. In turn, Sears has supplied the technical knowledge to enable these manufacturers to adopt modern mass-production methods. It has frequently supplied the capital to establish these businesses. In some cases, it has persuaded local businessmen to mobilize local capital. In other instances it has provided credits for the purchase of raw materials and the machinery needed to establish new industries.

Today, Sears no longer uses Latin America as an outlet for U.S.-made goods. All told, about 60 percent of its Latin American merchandise is manufactured by Latin Americans in Latin America. In Brazil 90 percent of the goods sold by Sears is locally manufactured.

Employment, too, has been local. Of Sears' 5,000 employees in Latin America, less than 2 percent are U.S. citizens.

Altogether, Sears has invested 27,850,000 dollars in its Latin American operations. With the exception of one small dividend from a Cuban subsidiary, every cent of profits has been plowed back into the countries where they were earned, to finance new stores and new products.

Non-American Investment Potential

I have taken the liberty of citing the contributions of *American* private investors to the development of economic activity abroad. But I do not want to imply that it is *only American* investment that can bring benefits to less developed countries. In fact, I think it is most important that we keep in mind the possibilities of overseas investment from other countries as well. The production trends in countries which historically have been capital exporters show a growing potential in their capital-goods industries. It was not so long ago that Western Europe was the fountainhead from which most of the development capital flowed. It should—indeed, it must—play that role again.

Nor have I intended to imply that foreign private investment can or should by itself meet the tremendous needs of the underdeveloped areas of the world. Under present-day conditions, it is all too apparent that there are important segments in the economies of the underdeveloped countries that require governmental initiative and government investment.

Nor am I suggesting that the contributions to the health and educational needs of their employees by private foreign investors is a substitute for governmental programs in these fields.

Nor, finally, is private foreign investment a substitute for the mobilization of local capital. In the last analysis, domestic capital must be the

largest component of any successful development program. We realize that the mobilization of such resources is not easy. We hope that the excellent work of ECLA and ECAFE in this field will help speed the solution of that problem.

Mr. Chairman, I have reviewed the important strides that the world has made in the field of economic development. I have pointed out that it is patently clear that we still have a great distance to go. Since the problem is a continuing one, it will give rise to continuing responsibilities on the part of every member of the U.N. community.

U.S. Attitudes

In this respect, I do not think that it is necessary for me to repeat what has so frequently been said by representatives of the U.S. Government in this and other organs of the United Nations, namely, that the people of the United States are fully appreciative of the size of the job that must still be done in the economic development of the underdeveloped countries. We recognize that many of these countries, particularly those that are least developed, will continue to require external assistance to provide the impetus to their basic development.

The fact that the free world has found it necessary to defend itself against military aggression does not mean that we are not ourselves aggressive in the war against poverty, ignorance, and disease.

We are moving forward along many avenues. Europe's postwar economic recovery, the great U.N. programs of emergency aid, the expanded U.N. program for technical assistance, and the cooperative undertakings in economic development as exemplified by the Colombo Plan and by our own programs of economic and technical assistance to the less developed countries—all of these are contemporary elements in our forward march together. All of these are major investments in a peaceful future.

The American people have contributed their share to these investments because they have faith in the future and in peace. And just as they have pledged their resources to fight military aggression so have they pledged their support to the war against want and human misery.

But I know that many of you are asking: Will this continue to be the policy of the American people and their Government?

I think I can truthfully say that the answer is: It will. This was made perfectly clear by each of our Presidential candidates a little over a week ago. Both have pledged their support to the continuation of our efforts to achieve the expansion of the world economy.

The American people, Mr. Chairman, are aware that we live in a closely knit and increasingly interdependent world. Knowing this, we shall fulfill our responsibilities in that world.

Soviet Harassment of Foreign Diplomats

*Statement by Senator Theodore F. Green
U.S. Representative to the General Assembly¹*

U.S./U.N. press release dated Oct. 29

Yesterday I listened attentively to the delegate from Yugoslavia as he described the mistreatment the diplomats of his country have suffered at the hands of the Cominform regimes. I regret to say that diplomats of my country, as well as U.S. citizens, have also been mistreated by these regimes.

In the view of my Government, conduct of this kind is a serious barrier to the normal communication of peoples and states. It is contrary to the basic precepts underlying the Charter. It is detrimental to the maintenance of peace.

Let me mention briefly the functions served by the old and universal practice of the exchange of representatives among civilized states. In recent years, as international life has increased in complexity, these functions have increased in number. I think we should find a wide measure of agreement on these four statements of principle:

First, a diplomat accredited to a foreign state represents his Government in important affairs of state, such as the negotiation of treaties.

Second, he serves as an official observer of developments and events which may affect the course of relations between the two countries.

Third, he serves as a protector of the persons and property of his country's nationals in the foreign state.

Fourth, and in modern times particularly, he engages in a two-way dissemination of information. Through information libraries and by related means, he tries to make available to the citizens of the foreign country such materials as will

promote friendship and mutual understanding. At the same time, he interprets to his own people at home the aspirations and way of life of the people among whom he lives and works.

Now I think that as you reflect upon these functions, you will agree that the ultimate issue raised by the treatment of foreign diplomats working behind the Iron Curtain cuts far deeper than a concern for diplomatic niceties and polite manners, important though these may be. For diplomats are not only human beings—in the last analysis, they are the living symbols of the countries they represent. Behind the Iron Curtain, they are, practically speaking, the only foreigners remaining there who can speak for the nations and peoples they represent. Restriction of their movements, officially inspired harassment of their activities, the leveling of false accusations against them—all this signifies more than an attempt to make life difficult and to interfere with their normal work. It would seem to be part of a systematic and deliberate effort to impair relations between peoples and to deepen existing tensions.

Cases From the Record

Indeed, what is particularly alarming is the way this effort has been intensified in the postwar period. Totalitarian governments have never been known to permit their citizens to have easy and friendly intercourse with the citizens of other countries. The Soviet regime is no exception to this rule. From its earliest days, it has tried to isolate its people from contact with the outside world. But since the end of the war, the period ironically which coincides with Soviet membership in the United Nations, this isolationism has been gaining frenzied momentum. Today, it seriously affects the work of diplomatic officials.

Let us briefly examine some case histories from the record.

U.S.S.R. Restrictions on Foreigners—In Janu-

¹ Made in Committee VI (Legal) on Oct. 30 on the item, "Giving Priority to the Codification of the Topic 'Diplomatic Intercourse and Immunities' in accordance with article 18 of the Statute of the International Law Commission." (The Commission is bound to give priority to requests from the General Assembly. Yugoslavia has proposed that the Assembly request priority for this item, which is the eleventh of 14 on the Commission's agenda.) The Committee adopted the proposal on Oct. 31.

ary of this year, the Soviet regime issued a decree which in effect converts 80 percent of the land mass of the Soviet Union into a forbidden zone.² This decree is the third and most far reaching of its kind to be issued since 1941. It prohibits foreigners, or even diplomats, from setting foot in any of the banned areas. The effects of this decree reach into this very Committee Room, in which representatives from the Ukraine and Byelorussia are sitting. Kiev and Minsk, the capital cities of these members of the United Nations, are on the forbidden list. If officials of the United Nations wanted to visit them, they would be unable to do so unless they received a special dispensation from Moscow.

Now these travel restrictions in the Soviet Union form only part of the total picture. Another Soviet decree, the State Secrets Act of 1947, drastically limits even the possibility of spoken or written communication between Soviet citizens and foreign diplomats. The average Soviet citizen thinks twice before speaking to a foreigner, lest he run afoul of the law. Our diplomatic officials similarly hesitate to speak to a Soviet citizen for fear of rendering him a suspicious character in the eyes of the Soviet regime.

These restrictions have contributed heavily to a tragedy involving some 2,000 persons in the Soviet Union of known or presumed American citizenship. In the early years of the postwar period many of them communicated to us their desire to return to the United States. Some of them came personally to the American Embassy in Moscow to present proof of their American citizenship. Today we have lost contact with them. The Soviet Government refuses to permit our officials to travel to the forbidden areas to see them. They in turn are refused permission to travel to Moscow to visit the Embassy. They are afraid to communicate with us by mail or telephone; and even when they live in the Moscow area, they are afraid to come to the Embassy in person.

It is certainly no exaggeration to say that this situation is unique in recent history. To describe it accurately, one would have to say that the Soviet regime has in effect placed foreign officials in a straight-jacket and, not content with this, has erected a towering soundproof wall around them.

So much for the situation in the Soviet Union. Is it, we may ask, any better in the Soviet-controlled countries of Eastern Europe? Unhappily the answer is "No." The pattern of Soviet practices in this, as in so many other matters, has spread throughout Eastern Europe.

Travel restrictions, state secret laws, false accusations, all the familiar elements of the Soviet pattern, are present in Eastern Europe. Let me

recall for you some of the cases which have occurred in recent years and which explain in part why the relations of my country with the regimes of Eastern Europe are so troubled and unsatisfactory.

The Shipkov Case—In 1950, you may remember, my Government was led to break off diplomatic relations with Bulgaria and recall its envoy, Donald Heath. The reason was the refusal of the Bulgarian Government to retract its prefabricated and unsubstantiated charges of subversion against Mr. Heath. What is unusual about this case is that only a few days after our Envoy's recall, the world was given a clear picture of the way in which such charges are invented. The U.S. Department of State released the affidavit of Michael Shipkov, a Bulgarian national who had worked for the American Legation in Sofia and had been arrested and tortured by the Bulgarian Secret Police into confessing every offense his torturers could invent. After a brief detention, Shipkov was ordered to return to the American Legation in Sofia and to serve as a spy for the Secret Police. Shipkov was a man of great courage and integrity. On his return to the Legation, he gave a sworn affidavit, describing the tortures he had suffered and retracting the confession the police had wrung from him. Unfortunately, Shipkov was arrested again, tortured again, tried by a so-called court, and imprisoned after one of the most tragic judicial farces of our day. Nonetheless the affidavit he gave our envoy before his second arrest throws a pitiless light on Communist justice and on the atmosphere in which our diplomats live and work behind the Iron Curtain.

Hungary's Detention of U.S. Fliers—Another important case of the same nature occurred while the sixth General Assembly was in session. You will recall that last year four American airmen, flying a C-47 plane, got lost and inadvertently crossed the Hungarian frontier. They were detained and held incommunicado by Soviet and Hungarian authorities.

What concerns us most here is the stubborn and implacable manner in which both Soviet and Hungarian officials refused U.S. representatives repeated requests for access to the airmen. Not only this, but both our diplomats and the airmen were prevented from obtaining their own legal counsel in the trial which took place. The trial itself was held in secret, without, as is normal, prior notification to the U.S. mission of its time and place. Need I add that the trial was a complete mockery of justice.

The restrictions imposed on U.S. representatives in Hungary have been equaled or surpassed by those of the Czechoslovak regime. Here again we find it practically impossible for a diplomat to carry out his normal tasks. The case of William Oatis is a tragic illustration. Let me recall it to you briefly.

The Oatis Case—William Oatis was the head of

² A map showing the restricted areas as of January 15, 1952, appeared in the BULLETIN of Mar. 24, 1952, facing p. 451. For a summary of Soviet travel restrictions, see *ibid.*, p. 452.

the Associated Press Bureau in Prague. He was arrested on April 23, 1951, charged with being a spy. In present day Czechoslovakia this is an elastic term which can be stretched to cover the most innocent activity, if the regime so desires. A spy, according to article 86, part 2, of the Czechoslovak Penal Code of July 12, 1950, is "anyone who attempts to obtain state secrets with the intention of betraying them to a foreign power."³ And a "state secret" is defined as "Everything that should be kept secret from unauthorized persons in an important interest of the Republic." This law speaks for itself.

After his arrest and before his mock trial, Oatis was kept incommunicado for 71 days. Official requests to see him were repeatedly denied. U.S. Embassy observers were permitted to attend his staged trial in seats at the rear of the courtroom from which they could with great difficulty follow the proceedings; but they were unable to communicate with the defendant. During the trial, Oatis was forbidden even to turn and look in their direction for fear he might receive some mental or moral encouragement which would affect the proceedings. This is what passes for justice behind the Iron Curtain.

Accusations Against Diplomats—Finally, to conclude this brief review, may I refer to another kind of harassment to which our diplomats are constantly being subjected behind the Iron Curtain. Hardly a month goes by that does not witness in one or another Eastern European country so-called trials in which foreign diplomats are accused of espionage or subversion. In recent months Poland and Czechoslovakia have staged such judicial travesties. Well-rehearsed witnesses recite their set pieces which invariably implicate U.S. diplomats in imaginary tales of espionage or subversion. No one takes these fictional dramas seriously, but the assumption which underlies them is serious. In effect, the Communists would have us believe that all foreign diplomats and consular officials are spies and saboteurs. Certainly, the proper conduct of international relations becomes practically impossible, when those officially entrusted with this task are constantly subjected to malicious accusations.

Inevitably, in considering the facts I have presented, one is led to ask: What are the real reasons and motives of this campaign of harassment and isolation of foreign diplomats behind the Iron Curtain?

Preventing Cracks in the Curtain

The answer, I think, is obvious. The regimes in power wish to prevent our representatives from seeing how they function and how their peoples live. At the same time, they do not want their own people to have the slightest chance of finding

out what other countries are like and how other peoples live. Basically the rulers of the Soviet world are well aware of the enormous disparity between their propaganda about life in their own workers' "paradise," as they call it, and the reality of that life as their people know it through bitter experience. They are afraid of internal dissatisfaction at home if their people should learn of better conditions existing in the outside world.

That is why they have rendered normal intercourse between their peoples and the outside world virtually impossible. That is why, for example, they go to such effort and expense to jam the broadcasts of the Voice of America. And it is why they must constantly increase the isolation of the handful of foreign diplomats in the vast Soviet empire. Any crack in the Iron Curtain is a danger.

The Soviet authorities constantly harp on something they call "diversionist" activities. This term is applied to any action of either their own peoples or foreigners which does not conform to the current Party line. It seems to me that the sponsors of this campaign are the true "diversionists." It is they who are desperately trying to *divert* their peoples' minds from oppression at home to hatred of all who are not subservient to the Kremlin. It is they who are trying to *divert* their peoples' anger and discontent from their own Government to all those who oppose Soviet domination.

These I think are some of the real reasons and motives behind the Soviet and satellite campaigns of harassment of foreign diplomats. This Committee should do what it can to help remedy the situation I have described. Obviously to encourage agreement on the rules and practices affecting the treatment of diplomatic and consular officials is a step in the right direction.

Moreover, agreed and accepted formulations would be particularly helpful if they contained provisions regarding such matters as personal privileges and immunities, asylum, protection of premises and archives, and the selection and recall of personnel. I also think these formulations should recognize that diplomatic and consular officials are entitled to all the freedoms necessary to perform their generally accepted duties—freedom of access to their own nationals for example, or access to all parts of the country except such small areas as are closed off for reasons of vital national security.

In the view of my Government, therefore, the proposal put forward by the Yugoslav Government is a sound one. At the same time I should like to advance two suggestions for consideration by the Yugoslav delegate and the Committee. First, the item as it now stands is limited to the question of the rules of diplomatic privileges and immunities. It would seem wise to broaden its scope and include within its frame of reference consular privileges and immunities. These two subjects are so closely related, it would be desirable and practical to have them treated together.

³ For text of this article and of Mr. Oatis' indictment, and excerpts from the proceedings of his trial, July 2-4, 1951, see *ibid.*, Aug. 20, 1951, pp. 283, 285-288.

Second, I suggest that we ask the International Law Commission to consider the advisability of taking up the item on a priority basis rather than directly requesting it to do so. The Commission already has a list of priority items. Any request requiring a change in the order of these items might seriously interfere with the orderly work of the Commission.

We must recognize in all frankness, meanwhile, that the work of the International Law Commis-

sion by itself cannot be expected to alter the deeply rooted behavior patterns of the Cominform regimes. Nonetheless, I think that a formulation of the accepted rules and practices in this field will be of definite value. It will help standardize the various rules and practices. It will serve as a measuring rod by which to judge the actions of all civilized governments. It may even, let us hope, help improve the formal relations between different states, and in this way contribute to the cause of peace.

U. N. Considers Freedom of Information

Statements by Charles A. Sprague

U.S. Representative to the General Assembly

THE NEED FOR A NEW APPROACH¹

As a newspaperman, I have followed the deliberations of the United Nations in the past in the field of freedom of information because the work this body has undertaken affects me very closely. It affects me as an editor first of all but also as a consumer of news who is interested in obtaining as much of it as possible, from as many sources as possible, in as truthful a form as possible.

The events that have taken place in the United Nations in the 4½ years following the Geneva Conference on Freedom of Information have been most significant. They are, I might say, among the most significant in the long history of man's struggle for free expression and of his efforts to safeguard the freedom already attained. But what has happened is quite different from what we hoped would happen.

The Geneva Conference brought forth the drafts of three conventions which the General Assembly reviewed in the fall and winter of 1948-49. Here arose the first unmistakable signs that all was not going well. Some delegates saw dangers in the right of free and objective news gathering. The right of correction,² an unprecedented concept in international news, was looked upon skeptically by other delegations.

¹ Made in Committee III (Social, Humanitarian, and Cultural) on Oct. 24. Mr. Sprague is editor and publisher of *The Oregon Statesman*, Salem, Oreg.

² The right-of-correction provisions finally worked out

The discussions of the Convention on Freedom of Information, both in 1949 and in 1950, reflected sharp and persistent clashes of views and concepts.

In 1950 the Assembly created an *ad hoc* committee to undertake a new draft of a Convention on Freedom of Information. Its product was so lacking in general support, even among its own members, that the Chairman declined to take a final vote on the draft as a whole. The U.S. delegation feels that there is sound ground for believing that the attitudes expressed by governments in the

in the U.N. General Assembly in 1949 for inclusion in the Convention on the International Transmission of News and the Right of Correction (generally referred to as the "News Gathering Convention") provide that in cases where a Contracting State contends that a news dispatch capable of injuring its relations with other states or its national prestige or dignity, transmitted from one country to another by correspondence or information agencies and published or disseminated abroad, is false or distorted, it may submit its version of the facts to the Contracting States within whose territories such dispatch has been published or disseminated. A Contracting State receiving such a communiqué would be obligated to release it to correspondents and information agencies operating in its territory, through channels customarily used for the release for publication of news concerning international affairs. If a Contracting State to which a communiqué has been transmitted fails to carry out this obligation, the protesting state may submit the communiqué to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who would then be called upon to give appropriate publicity to it through information channels at his disposal.

On Nov. 1 the Committee voted 25-19-10 to open for signature the Convention on the Right of Correction. The United States voted against the proposal.

course of these debates were more restrictionist than those of the press or radio people in the same countries.

The special committee recommended a special conference to complete the Convention. The Economic and Social Council in 1951 recommended to the contrary.

A similar history of backing and filling, of decisions reversed only to be themselves reversed, has taken place in connection with the work of the Subcommittee on Freedom of Information. Its objectives were most meritorious, but it fell far short of these objectives. The Economic and Social Council recommended that it be abolished. The General Assembly in 1951 gave it a new but temporary lease on life. Now a temporary rapporteur has replaced the Subcommittee in an effort to find a new and better method, experimentally, for reaching our goals. The whole history of United Nations in this field is well reviewed in the statement of Mr. Lopez which you have on your desks this morning.³

To sum up, Mr. Chairman, it seems to me that the history of the last 5 years dictates its own conclusion. It has been shown that the writing of treaties on freedom of information is not the way to promote freedom of information, at least at this time. Our disagreements range over too wide a sphere and they are not growing smaller. We have cross currents of ideas and tides of opinion which ebb and flow. We cannot tell where they will take us, except that it appears certain that if we continue our present course we will skirt perilously close to rocks and shoals dangerous to liberty.

The distinguished delegate of Saudi Arabia has asked why the United Nations has made so little progress in drafting international instruments concerning freedom of information. He has asked why the Economic and Social Council appears to shelve these instruments. The answers to these questions are to be found in the records of many different meetings of U.N. organs. There is simply no general agreement at the present time on what should go into an international instrument. For this reason, it is the view of the U.S. Government and of the American press that it is better for the world to have no treaty than to have a treaty that provides, as the distinguished delegate of Sweden said yesterday, freedom from information instead of freedom of information.

In these circumstances, it seems to my delegation that the only alternative is to undertake a new approach, to search for other methods which will carry us safely to our common objective.

Our first consideration, it seems to me, should be our combined safety and security. We live in times of tension and apprehension. Therefore since unity is vitally important, it is imperative

that the free world know more about its various parts, that we gain in mutual understanding.

Now let me be plain, Mr. Chairman, that I am not advocating, as I say this, a solution that I think simple and easy of execution. The task of reaching a meeting of the minds is exceedingly difficult. In many instances, our respective national histories and our ways of life have taken widely separate paths. We have differences which we must learn to understand in order that we may work them out in harmony.

Moreover, while I advocate the course of maximum freedom, I am fully aware that freedom of the press can be abused and is abused, in my own country as well as in others. None of us is perfect; we all have among us emotional people, and people who lack good judgment, and people who are just plain dishonest. Editors, being human, have their share of these unfortunate traits of human nature.

In my country we have laws against libel and slander, but otherwise we depend mainly upon overcoming falsehood and propaganda by the free circulation of the truth. The best form of restraint upon abuse is more information and more accurate information.

Restriction of information hides abuse and makes it more difficult to detect and curb. But equally important, and deeply affecting relations among nations, is the fact that restricting the flow of information across international boundaries breeds isolation, and isolation breeds suspicion, distrust, and fear. The greater the flow of free and objective information, the stronger can be the ties of friendship and understanding which form the basis of our common safety and our common well-being.

Rapporteur Appointed

The appointment of a rapporteur on freedom of information by the Economic and Social Council is an excellent first step in this direction. My Government is doubly pleased with this step because of the election to the post of Salvador Lopez of the Philippines. He has had wide experience in press affairs and in U.N. affairs. I am confident that the press of my country will give him every cooperation in his difficult task.

If the rapporteur plan works as I think the Council intended, the Economic and Social Council will have a report on the obstacles which impede the free flow of information. From that we may better determine by what manner or means we can break down those barriers. We would hope to discover through him not only the violations of freedom of information—though we must surely watch over these—but also the constructive ways in which our respective needs for information can be met.

As a second point, my delegation recognizes that many countries lack adequate media of commun-

³ The statement of Salvador Lopez, the temporary rapporteur on Freedom of Information, is U.N. doc. A/C.3/L. 250/Add.1, dated Oct. 23, 1952.

ications due to the limitations of their available resources. The dearth of free, independent, and competently manned newspapers, magazines, radio stations, and of news-gathering organizations impedes the free flow of information to their peoples.

Strengthening of Domestic News Media Vital

Yet it is vitally important that the domestic news media of such countries—indeed, of all countries—do grow and become strong and independent. I say this not only because personally I believe it to be essential to a healthy, democratic national life but because it is in the interest of my own country. The foreign policy of the United States toward each nation and toward the United Nations depends in the final analysis upon the information that the *people* of the United States have about other countries, whether they understand their problems and our *common* problems. Those of you who are familiar with newspaper and radio operations know how a strong domestic press can contribute to that understanding. As your correspondents visit the United States, they cannot possibly “cover” so vast an area by themselves. They depend heavily on what they read in our newspapers. The same is true when our correspondents travel overseas. The growth of the press in each of your countries is a contribution to our knowledge and at the same time your people learn more about us.

It is the hope of my delegation that this process of growth can somehow be speeded up. We feel that perhaps we have not used the tools of technical assistance as fully and effectively as we might in the field of press and radio. Under one of the resolutions adopted by the Economic and Social Council last summer, UNESCO has been asked to prepare recommendations on methods by which the development of domestic news media can be stimulated. I suggest that it would be worth while both for our rapporteur on freedom of information and for UNESCO to look into the question of utilizing what we call the “regular” program of technical assistance in the U.N. budget to help meet this need.

In our examination of this problem within my Government, we have found that a great deal already is being done, both publicly and by private organizations. Under the Exchange of Persons Program operated by the Department of State, 486 persons in the mass-media field visited the United States in the last year, and the number is expected to increase during the current year. Under the Mutual Security Program, 69 visitors have come from Europe.

In addition, the newspaper and radio media organizations in the United States themselves have provided extensive assistance to visiting groups of editors, publishers, radio broadcasters and executives, and others seeking to learn about our meth-

ods. Again, I believe it would be profitable for our rapporteur and for UNESCO to explore this field also.

Another technique worth looking into is the seminar. U.N. agencies have obtained beneficial results in social welfare, in resource development, and in other fields by bringing together experts to exchange ideas. Similar meetings, bringing together the actual editors, publishers, and organizers of mass media who would have to face the financial and technical problems of news gathering and distribution, might be of great value in the information field. This might be done on a world-wide or, perhaps preferably, on a regional basis.

These are a few of the ways in which we in the United Nations can approach our common information problems in a manner designed to promote understanding and good will. We have learned, through 6 years of inconclusive discussion, that the drafting of a treaty in this field is not only difficult and costly but usually futile. We find that we are no nearer agreement today than we were a year ago, or 3 years ago, or 6 years ago.

Something far more basic than the writing of legal language must take place before we can go forward profitably with the drafting of treaties. There must be a drawing together of the minds—of the minds that now are widely divergent in their thinking. This will come about, I believe, mainly by sharing our experiences and our problems. We can aid the process by enabling editors, and publishers, and reporters, and managers to meet in greater numbers and in a manner that will cause them to focus upon their common problems, compare them, and share the methods of cooperation by which they have been overcome.

For these reasons, I suggest on behalf of my delegation that we leave the various treaties on freedom of information which have been drafted and proposed in *status quo*. Let the rapporteur proceed with his work. Let the Economic and Social Council hear his report and the report of UNESCO. Then we will have better light in which to study our future course.

As matters stand now, our differences make it most impractical to attempt anew to draft a treaty on freedom of information or to ask a special conference to do so.⁴ The right of correction as contained in the Newsgathering Convention could be badly abused, becoming a vehicle for propaganda and even a source of friction among states. The news-gathering sections themselves never have had the wide support my Government hoped for them. While we consider the freedoms contained in these articles to be highly important, as an interim measure we do have the alternative of working out bilateral treaties with countries desir-

⁴ Committee III on Oct. 30 rejected by a vote of 23-23-8 a proposal to draft the proposed treaty on freedom of information at this session of the General Assembly. The United States voted against this proposal.

ing to protect the gathering and transmission of news under legal instruments.

It is plain, it seems to me, that the Committee and the United Nations stand to gain the most by deferring to a course now being tested by the Economic and Social Council.

I said as I began my remarks that I was a consumer of news. As such, I am but one among hundreds of millions in the world. These consumers of news are the persons we must think about in our deliberations. Are they to have greater knowledge from their schools and universities? Are they to have greater skills and better techniques? Are they to have a better understanding of their own problems, of the problems of their neighbors, and of the problems facing the world? These are the problems which determine peace or war, progress or stagnation, hope or frustration. The wisdom to solve them comes only with greater knowledge and greater information. This should be the direction of our efforts.

DEFENSE OF THE U.S. PRESS⁵

U.S./U.N. press release dated October 28

The delegation of the United States has already participated in the general debate and it has expressed its views with reference to the broad subject of freedom of information, and I do not intend to supplement that expression at the present time.

In the course of that expression, the delegation of the United States avoided political issues and avoided making any adverse comment or reference to the press or publicity media of other states. It is a matter of regret to me that the delegation representing the Soviet Union and others of the Soviet bloc have seen fit in the course of their participation in the debate to make an attack or a criticism and a severe and sweeping condemnation of the press of the United States and of certain other countries. In view of that fact I, at the conclusion of the address of the delegate from the Soviet Union, reserved the right to reply. And that is what I wish to do at this time.

I am not unaware of defects in the press of the United States, as I admitted on the occasion of my earlier address, and I relish very much those lines of Bobbie Burns: "Oh wad some power the giftie gie us, to see oursels as others see us."

But the picture which has been presented to us by the delegate of the Soviet Union and others of the Soviet bloc is so grotesque and distorted that it seems to me a masterpiece of surrealist art. I am wholly unable to identify any of the elements of the picture which he has drawn as a true depiction of the American press. I am confident that the vast majority of the delegates to this Committee and to this Assembly, who have had and are having familiarity with the newspapers and radios

of the United States, are likewise unable to relate the picture which has been drawn to the reality which they experience from day to day by their residence in this city.

Let me address myself to some of the specific charges which are brought.

The first charge was that of monopoly. Now, by monopoly we would understand that it is a monopoly of ownership or monopoly of control. Let me give you some information with reference to the number of periodicals and radio stations in the United States.

There are in this country 1,773 daily newspapers, 543 Sunday newspapers, 9,591 weekly newspapers, 1,421 weekly periodicals, 221 semimonthly periodicals, 3,643 monthly periodicals, 625 quarterly periodicals. There are three Nation-wide press associations. There are four radio networks. There are over 3,000 radio stations including AM and FM stations and television stations. Moreover, these are not in any single ownership by any manner of means. The ownership is most widely diversified.

Reference has been made to what is called the McCormick press. There are only three papers in the United States that might be so designated.

Reference has been made to the Hearst press. I think it numbers only around 12 or 14; yet, we have among daily papers 1,773 scattered over the United States.

Press and Radio Ownership in U.S. Diversified

So it is folly to say that there is a monopoly of ownership or of control.

Let me cite my own case, because I am an American journalist and perhaps I might offer myself as "Exhibit A" for the press of the United States. I operate—my family and I own, and I am the publisher and editor—a small daily paper, relatively small, with a circulation of less than 20,000 in a city of less than 50,000. There are in that same city one other daily paper, one weekly paper, and three radio stations, all under separate and independent ownership and control.

That is a fair illustration of the diversity of ownership and control of the American press and radio stations. This ownership is largely either personal or family or corporate. There are very few papers with stocks in public hands or stocks which are traded on the exchanges. And the same is true of magazines. The American press and radio stations are privately owned and professionally operated.

The charge has been made with some citation from American authority that the newspapers of the United States are controlled by their advertisers. Now, that is an ancient fiction. It may have been true and it may yet be true that there are isolated instances where advertisers on occasion exert undue influence in the editions of particular papers. However, that is not generally true. As

⁵ Made in Committee III (Social, Humanitarian, and Cultural) on Oct. 28.

a general rule, in the papers of the United States, there is strict segregation of responsibility between the business office, so-called, and the news and editorial departments. And it is one of the elements of ethics within the newspaper profession of the United States that the editorial and news departments shall be run professionally and that they shall not be subjected to the influence of the business office. I have had many experiences where advertisers have sought to suggest omission of news that they thought might be detrimental to them, but regularly we ignore them, reject any such overtures. That is the prevailing attitude among the newspapers and the responsible editors of the United States.

The Development of the Press in the U.S.

The second thing, I think, that is necessary is that we understand something of the nature of the development of the press of the United States. Let me quote from the Constitution of our country, the first amendment to the Constitution, adopted almost simultaneously with the adoption of the original document:

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or of the right of people peaceably to assemble and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.

You will note there that Congress is prohibited from abridging the freedom of speech or of the press.

Let me quote from the Constitution of the State of New York:

Every citizen may freely speak, write, and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for abuse of that right, and no law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press.

Then, another sentence with reference to liability under the Law of Libel. And this is an extract from the Constitution of my own State under which I operate a paper:

No law shall be passed restraining the free expression of opinion or restricting the right to speak, write, or print freely on any subject whatever, but every person shall be responsible for the abuse of this right.

Now, the history of freedom of the press in the United States antedates the adoption of the Constitution of the States of the Government. It antedates the formation of the United States of America. It goes back to a certain trial held in this city in the year 1733, when John Peter Zenger, a printer, published a matter which was regarded by the Royal Governor of the then New York Colony as scurrilous and reflecting upon him as the official representative of His Majesty. A trial was held; Zenger was thrown in jail but he demanded a trial. That trial was held and became one of the historic trials in the history of American jurisprudence. At the conclusion of that trial,

the jurists' verdict was "Not guilty." That became the foundation of the American principle of freedom of the press, which then was incorporated in the first amendment to the Constitution and subsequently in the Constitutions of the various States of the Federal Union.

Now, when we say freedom in this country, we mean freedom; and just as you have exercised wide liberty of expression here in the presentation of your views on this subject, so we of the American press and radio exercise wide freedom in the expression of our views on public questions of all kinds.

When you have this freedom, you do open the way to abuse. There are those individuals who may be irresponsible, those individuals whose judgment may not be sound, those individuals who may not have had very much experience in affairs, individuals who may be driven by selfish interests or driven by emotional outbursts. They may vent themselves either in the columns of a newspaper or by putting out some handbill or by making some appeal over a radio station. That is one of the prices we have to pay for freedom. But in the United States we relish that freedom so much that we pay that cost, and we feel that under this institution of a free press, the press of the United States has risen to a very high standard when it comes to the delivery of information that is true and valid to our people and giving reasonable and honest comment thereon.

You have here in the city of New York an excellent example of the range of this freedom of expression in the newspapers of this city. That range will extend, let me say, from a paper like the *Daily News*, which is ultraconservative, or the *New York World-Telegram & Sun* in the same category, on to the other extreme of the ultra-liberal, *New York Compass*, or the Communist *Daily Worker*. You have here exhibited before you this very wide range of freedom of expression. You have within that group certainly that paper recognized world-wide as a superior medium of information, the *New York Times*, and one which is closely parallel to it, the *New York Herald Tribune*.

U.S. Papers Not Dependent on Government Subsidy

The decision as to the prosperity of those papers rests upon the persons who go to buy those papers. Our papers are not dependent upon any government subsidy. They are not dependent upon business for subventions. They are dependent on two sources of revenue. One is their circulation revenue and the other is their advertising revenue. And their advertising revenue depends very largely upon the extent and the nature of their circulation. So it is the customer who decides the strength of a newspaper. It is the customer who decides, as he goes to a newspaper stand and picks up the *New York Post*, or the *New York*

Journal American, or the *New York Times*, or the *Daily Worker*. He is the one who decides what it is that he wants to read. And that is his privilege. But we put out these various organs of opinion for the choice of the public, and as they choose so is the prosperity or the continuity of that newspaper or of that publication or of that radio station decided.

Reference has been made in the presentation by the delegation of the Soviet Union to certain criticisms of the American press. The "Hutchins' Report," for instance, was cited, and that report has been replied to by certain other circles in the American newspaper field. However, I would call your attention to the fact that the "Hutchins' Report" was financed in whole or in very large part by one of the publishing organizations in the United States. I think virtually all of the citations that have been made by the delegation from the Soviet Union and the other delegations within the Soviet bloc have been taken from American publications, from reports, and studies. We admit those abuses but what we call your attention to is the fact that we are aware of them and that we are under constant pressure to improve the standard of performance of our papers. We are under pressure within our own professional circles. We are under pressure at our schools and colleges of journalism. And we are under pressure from critics in the general public scene. That very awareness, which is evidenced by these comments appearing in books, in magazines, in newspapers, certainly is proof that we are trying consciously and continuously to improve the character and the truthfulness of our publications.

Warmongering Charge Refuted

I want to say something with reference to this accusation of warmongering which is leveled against the United States. Now, by the process of selectivity, one can prove almost anything when he has the range of opinion from A to Z, and so forth, to draw from. If one were to extract from the addresses made here in this Committee certain selected portions he could prove almost any case with reference to the subjects we have had under discussion. But I submit to you that selectivity in a case where we have complete and general freedom of expression is no proof of the general character of the press and the radio and the other media of communication within the United States. It is merely building a case by selection of material or evidence which might go to support introduction of what you might say is a bill of particulars. We cannot judge the American press by any such process of selectivity.

Let me say this for my own part as the editor of a small paper. I write my own editorials, with

some assistance from members of my staff. I am subject to no control from the government or from anyone else. And over and over, and over and over, I have emphasized the necessity of settling our international disputes through the processes of negotiation and diplomacy and through the use of the facilities of the United Nations which was set up as a great instrumentality for the maintenance of world order and justice.

I know of no responsible newspaper within my area, or within the United States, which is promoting consciously a third world war.

Now, one of the speakers from the Soviet bloc made certain citations from the American press with reference to the dropping of bombs on cities in China and the blockade of the Chinese coast. I would say that that is not germane to the point which they sought to prove for the reason that a war is in progress in the Far East in which the United Nations already has branded North Korea and Communist China as aggressors. And the purpose of those citations, the purpose of the editors of those periodicals was not to initiate a global war, but rather it was to bring to an early end the war which has been launched by the Communist bloc and has been characterized as an aggressive war against the principles of the United Nations.

With reference to other citations, I do not think you can dredge up in the whole American press more than isolated instances of where there may be recommendations that we should initiate any war. Certainly, the whole body of opinion in the American press, as I have been familiar with it, is disposed to hate war, to want to avoid it, to exert every effort that we possibly can to avert a global war, with all of the horrors which it would bring to us and to the whole world. That reflects the true and honest attitude of the press of the United States, and I cannot emphasize it too strongly to all of the delegates who are here assembled. The ambition of the press of the United States is to bring the war in Korea to an early and an honorable conclusion. The armament which we are engaging in at the present time is something that has been forced upon us, but I do not mean to infringe upon questions that properly belong in the Political Committee.

I merely want to repeat that the press of the United States is not a warmongering press, that it is sincerely devoted to the cause of peace and justice in the world.

Now, I should like to reserve my reply with reference to the statements of the delegate from the U.S.S.R. and others of the Soviet bloc with respect to the devotion of their periodicals and publications to the cause of peace, to the time when the resolution offered by the delegation from the Soviet Union is under consideration by this Committee.

Report of U.N. Command Operations in Korea

FORTY-EIGHTH REPORT: FOR THE PERIOD JUNE 16-30, 1952¹

U.N. doc.S/2789

Transmitted September 25, 1952

I herewith submit report number 48 of the United Nations Command Operations in Korea for the period 16-30 June 1952, inclusive. United Nations Command communiqués numbers 1297-1311 provide detailed accounts of these operations.

The senior United Nations Command Delegate recessed the plenary armistice session twice during the period for three days each recess. The first recess covered the period from 18 through 20 June and the second from 27 through 30 June. These recesses were serious attempts to impress the Communists that the United Nations Command would not allow the Armistice Conferences to become an official outlet for their violent propaganda outbursts. In addition, it was hoped that the Communists would realize that the United Nations Command position on prisoners of war was reasonable, firm and final. The main Communist propaganda theme was their distorted version of the Geneva Convention.

In order to refute the illogical arguments and bitter propaganda attacks against the free world, there follow examples of statements made by the senior United Nations Command Delegate:

From the proceedings of 26 June:

I would like to refer to your remarks of yesterday and today regarding the actions of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in extending the right of self-determination to certain German and Hungarian soldiers during World War II. By some obscure form of logic which must surely be as incomprehensible to the world as it is to us of the United Nations Command Delegation sitting inside this tent, you have arrived at the conclusion that because the historical situations are dissimilar, the moral principles involved are dissimilar. You emphasize the point

¹ Transmitted to the Security Council by the representative of the U.S. to the U.N. on September 25. Texts of the 30th, 31st, and 32d reports appear in the BULLETIN of Feb. 18, 1952, p. 266; the 33d report, Mar. 10, 1952, p. 395; the 34th report, Mar. 17, 1952, p. 430; the 35th report, Mar. 31, 1952, p. 512; the 36th and 37th reports, Apr. 14, 1952, p. 594; the 38th report, May 5, 1952, p. 715; the 39th report, May 19, 1952, p. 788; the 40th report, June 23, 1952, p. 998; the 41st report, June 30, 1952, p. 1038; the 42d report, July 21, 1952, p. 114; the 43d report, Aug. 4, 1952, p. 194; the 44th report, Aug. 11, 1952, p. 231; the 45th report, Aug. 18, 1952, p. 272; the 46th report, Sept. 29, 1952, p. 495; and the 47th report, Oct. 27, 1952, p. 668.

that the actions we cited were those of "a victorious army demanding the surrender of a losing army during hostilities." Is it your contention, then, that under one set of circumstances a nation may adopt a certain code of national morality and that under the other circumstances an entirely different standard is acceptable? Is it your proposition that a nation should provide itself with an adjustable scale of decency—that it is wholly justified in being humane at one time and barbarous at another? If this is not the true meaning of your reply, what do you mean? Or is it possible that you are condemning the Soviet declarations?

As though any statement you make must be accepted as true merely because you make it, you blandly state that the examples we cited are out of context, are out of place, and have no bearing on the subject of our present discussions. You cannot dismiss evidence so easily. Any person reading the historical facts which we provided you cannot help but be aware that they are both specific and substantial. Their meaning is too evident to be at variance with any other portions of the declarations of which they are a part. Your attempts to defend yourselves against those uncomfortable facts would be ludicrous were our present business not so vitally concerned with human suffering and tragedy.

If you intend ultimately to agree to an armistice, your present attitude rejecting our proposal of 28 April² is a hopeless procedure in which you waste your time and continue to suffer the damages of war.

From the proceedings of 25 June:

Today, on the second anniversary of your treacherous attack against the Republic of Korea, we are meeting here in an effort to conclude a just and honorable armistice and put an end to this bloody conflict.

On 28 April, the United Nations Command presented to you a compromise proposal capable of resolving our remaining differences. This proposal is fair and reasonable. It represents major concessions on the part of the United Nations Command and is our ultimate negotiatory effort. However, after nearly two months you persist in your refusal to accept our humane proposal which would lead to peace for this war-torn peninsula. You insist that the United Nations Command ignore a fundamental human right and deliver prisoners of war to you by force. That we will never do. Your stand on this issue is a willful perversion of the humanitarian aims of the Geneva Convention. You completely ignore the basic purpose and intent of a document which was designed to delineate and protect the rights of prisoners of war.

You stand alone in your malevolent misinterpretation of the Geneva Convention. You even disagree publicly with the stated policy of the country from which you

² For text, see BULLETIN of Aug. 18, 1952, p. 272.

adopted your political and social ideology. On 21 June we documented for you the historical precedent set by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in offering in 1943 the right of self-determination to German and Hungarian soldiers. We also documented for you the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic's official endorsement of this policy in 1951.

The United Nations Command has presented you with a fair, reasonable, and humanitarian proposal to end hostilities in Korea entirely in accord with the aims of the Geneva Convention. Unless you are guided by ulterior motives, unless you have no desire for peace and are completely lacking in good faith, you will accept that proposal. I suggest that we recess to permit you to reconsider your position.

On 15 June, the United Nations Command requested the Communists to furnish information on the location of unmarked prisoner of war camps. On 17 June, the Communists answered by indicating that Camp No. 11 had been abolished and its prisoners incorporated into other prisoner of war camps. In addition, the Communists stated that all their prisoner of war camps have been provided with clear markings. This claim by the Communists could not be substantiated by detailed and careful aerial reconnaissance and photography, which revealed that Camps numbered 2, 6, 9 and 10 were not marked.

As the operation for segregating the Communist prisoners of war into smaller, newly constructed compounds continued, it became increasingly apparent that the United Nations Command would be successful in re-establishing internal order within its prisoner of war camps.

By 20 June, over 70,000 prisoners were affected in the move to the new compounds. Incidents were few and minor. The orders of the camp authorities were promptly obeyed. Among those moved were approximately 47,000 prisoners who were formerly in compounds where the mutinous and violent attitudes of the Communist prisoners of war leaders prevented interviewing of the prisoners of war. In order to determine a round number for submission to the Communists, the United Nations Command had previously made an estimate of the number in this group who could be repatriated to Communist control. This estimated number was added to the results obtained in those compounds where the prisoners of war were actually interviewed. The sum was a round number of 70,000 individuals which was submitted to the Communists as our estimate. This was an approximation and we were always prepared to repatriate any larger number resulting from more complete information. Accordingly, it was decided to complete the screening of the unscreened prisoners of war and civilian internees. The reasons for doing this were twofold: first, to segregate the Communists from the anti-Communists in order to reduce the incidents which had always occurred when individuals of these opposite political beliefs lived in the same compounds together. The second reason was to obtain an accurate figure of those whom the United Nations Command could offer in the Armistice Negotiations to repatriate to the Communists.

The final phase of the screening operation began on 23 June and was completed 27 June. The same procedure was employed in this operation as was used in the previous screening called Operation SCATTER. Again, careful steps were taken to insure that there was no forced

screening of individuals. The entire operation was completed without incident. The press of many nations witnessed the operation. Based on the results of the completed screening an accurate figure of those to be repatriated to the Communists is being prepared. This completion of screening in no way alters the United Nations Command offer to the Communists for a re-screening of those who indicated that they would forcibly resist repatriation.

In line with its previously stated position that loyal civilian internees would be released as soon as circumstances permitted, the United Nations Command directed the release of approximately 27,000 of the Republic of Korea civilian internees now being held in protective custody. The release of these civilians began on 29 June and will be effected over a period of several weeks. These civilians are residents of the Republic of Korea who have been taken into protective custody by the United Nations Command during the fighting in Korea. As nationals of the Republic of Korea, their disposition is an internal affair of that government. Their names were not included in the lists of prisoners of war exchanged by the armistice delegations at Panmunjom on 18 December 1951. Included among them are some who had been impressed into the service of the North Korean Peoples Army when its forces were overrunning the Republic of Korea and who had served the enemy forces prior to being taken into custody. Others had been taken into custody as security risks even though not identified with the armed forces of the enemy.

The enemy's common practice of wearing civilian clothes for the purpose of infiltrating our front lines during the early days of the Korean war resulted in the detention of many innocent civilians. Release of these civilian internees has been delayed because of the difficulty of performing dependable screening and investigation to determine that they are, in fact, loyal Republic of Korea citizens. A thorough and complete loyalty check—a precaution fully justified by later developments—has now been effected. The civilians will be returned to their areas of residence in all provinces of the Republic of Korea including Kyongsang Namdo, Kyongsand Pukto, Cholla Namdo, Cholla Pukto, Chunchong Namdo, Chungchong Pukto, Kyonggi-do and Kwangwan-do. Each released civilian will be given a thirty-day supply of rations, a shirt, a blanket, a pair of trousers, underwear, shoes, two pairs of socks, a hat or cap, and overcoat.

During the mass evacuation of civilians which took place in the early days of the Korean conflict, the United Nations Command had no civil assistance organization. In the absence of such an organization, many wounded civilians were evacuated through military channels in order that they might be provided medical attention. They are included among those to be released. The medical facilities of Enclosure 10 at Pusan will be available for the continued hospitalization of civilians under medical treatment pending their final release.

Also included among the civilians to be released are many young children who in most cases were taken into custody along with their parents in order to avoid separating families. These are being cared for by the United Nations Command as war victims. The United Nations

Civil Assistance Command for Korea (UNCACK) is assisting in the return of these civilians to their home areas. The move is expected to assist the economy at a time when maximum manpower is needed to work the farms and assist in reviving industry in the Republic of Korea.

On the ground the enemy continued to react vigorously to United Nations Command offensive operations and patrolling. The heaviest fighting occurred on the western front where the enemy launched attacks of up to regimental strength against newly won United Nations Command outpost positions. These attacks were supported by artillery fire of unprecedented volume.

On the western front the enemy made a determined bid to regain outpost positions lost early in June. Action was heaviest in the Mabang area where two battalion strength attacks were mounted on successive days. The first enemy battalion attack south of Mabang was repulsed after a five-hour fire fight leaving United Nations Command elements in possession of their recently won positions. The second attack, supported by tank or self-propelled gun fire, was turned back after only twenty minutes of fighting during the early morning hours of 17 June. This series of attacks culminated in a regimental strength attack during the night of 20/21 June supported by the heaviest enemy artillery concentrations of the war. Over 10,000 rounds of artillery fire fell on forward elements of a United Nations Command division. The attack was repulsed without loss of United Nations Command-held territory after a six-hour fight. The enemy lost ground in the Mabang area again on 26 June when a United Nations Command attack forced an estimated enemy battalion from high ground southwest of Mabang after eight hours of stubborn enemy resistance. This outpost repulsed three battalion-size attacks during the hours of darkness 27-28 June. Elsewhere on the western front the enemy was kept off balance by several small-scale limited objective attacks by United Nations Command elements.

Enemy action along the central and eastern fronts was characterized by scattered probes and strong resistance to continuous United Nations Command patrolling. An exception was the vicinity of Kumsong where, on 18 June, the enemy began a series of six attacks ranging from company to battalion strength in an unsuccessful attempt to recapture commanding terrain southeast of Kumsong. Heavy fighting continued until the afternoon of 19 June without the loss of any United Nations Command position. Again on 21 June two enemy companies supported by heavy mortar and artillery fire attacked a United Nations Command outpost in the same area without success.

In friendly rear areas no significant change occurred in the level of guerrilla activity. Upwards of 150 guerrillas attacked and destroyed a South Korean train twenty miles north of Kwangju on the evening of 24 June. United Nations Command security forces continued their pursuit of dissident elements whose sporadic bandit-type attacks have, for the most part, been confined to small raids on villages or farms in search of food and supplies.

At no time during the period was any major change in enemy troop dispositions or front lines noted. Although the enemy continued to improve his combat capabilities, there is no evidence as to when he may initiate a major offensive.

On the night of 6-7 June, critical and strongly held terrain features in the sector of the 45th Infantry Division were captured and held against numerous strong enemy counter-attacks for the next fifteen days. During the several engagements it is estimated that the enemy suffered over 3,500 casualties.

From 12 June thru 27 June, when strongly defended enemy positions in the sector of the 6th Republic of Korea Division were captured, these positions were held against strong enemy attacks in superior numbers. The results included 207 confirmed enemy dead and ten prisoners of war.

United Nations Command fast carriers in the Sea of Japan operated against North Korean transportation facilities and supply routes. Attacks by jet and propeller driven aircraft were concentrated on targets along the Korean east coast. Rail lines were cut in numerous places and many installations and quantities of matériel were destroyed and damaged including the following: power plants, railway bridges, highway bridges, rail cars, supply dumps, military buildings, troop barracks, trucks and AA guns.

Rescue operations were conducted in the face of heavy ground fire and proved costly. A United Nations Command air force helicopter attempting to rescue a downed United Nations naval pilot, picked up the downed pilot but was shot down by anti-aircraft fire en route to safety. A second United Nations Command air force rescue helicopter, returning to its base to lighten the craft of a crewman, crashed on landing and was destroyed. Meanwhile a United Nations Command air force aircraft flying rescue counter air patrol over the downed pilot was hit by anti-aircraft fire and crashed. Other rescue aircraft later observed the first helicopter crew and the naval pilot being captured. Two days later a United Nations Command naval helicopter rushed to pick up a United Nations Command air force pilot who had bailed out of his jet aircraft near the east coast of Korea. Despite enemy opposition the helicopter crew recovered the pilot's body and returned to its base.

United Nations Command aircraft carriers continued to operate in the Yellow Sea as their planes furnished cover and air spot for the surface units on blockade patrols and anti-invasion stations. They also flew reconnaissance missions and offensive strikes as far north as Hanchon into the Chinnampo area, the Hwanghae Province and in close support of the front line troops. The bulk of the damage inflicted was on military structures. Six major transformer stations on the Hwanghae Peninsula were destroyed and one damaged as part of the effort against enemy power installations. Additional destruction and damage included numerous supplies, bridges, gun positions, warehouses, boats, oxcarts and pack animals.

United Nations Command naval aircraft based ashore in Korea flew in support of the interdiction programme and the front line units. These aircraft destroyed bunkers, mortar and gun positions, tanks, personnel and supply shelters, trucks, and military buildings. Rails were cut in many places and numerous enemy casualties were inflicted.

Patrol planes based in Japan conducted daylight reconnaissance missions over the Sea of Japan, the Yellow Sea

and the Tsushima Straits. They also flew day and night anti-submarine patrols and weather reconnaissance missions for surface units in the Japan and Yellow Seas.

The naval blockade continued along the Korean east coast from the bomblines to Chongjin, with surface units making day and night coastal patrols firing on key rail targets along the coastal main supply route daily to maintain rail cuts, bridge cuts, and blocked tunnels at these several specific points. The siege by surface vessels continued at the major ports of Wonsan, Hungnam, and Songjin, subjecting the enemy forces at these ports to day and night destructive, harassing and interdiction fire.

Fog along the east coast at Wonsan and to the north hampered spotting aircraft, shore fire control parties, and the firing vessels themselves. Destruction reported included enemy casualties, military buildings, boats, rail cars, rail bridges, warehouses, guns, bunkers, and locomotives. Rails were cut in several places.

Fire support vessels at the bomblines provided gun fire on call for the front line troops. Destruction and damage included bunkers, military buildings, gun and mortar positions and warehouses.

Enemy shore batteries were active almost daily against the blockading vessels and minesweepers all along the coast. In many instances friendly units were straddled but no hits or casualties were reported. In each instance the battery was taken under counter fire with many guns destroyed and damaged.

Minesweepers operating close inshore received machine gun and small arms fire. There were no reports of damage or casualties.

On the Korean west coast, the United Nations Command surface units manned anti-invasion stations along the coast from Chinnampo to the Han River Estuary, in support of the friendly islands north of the battle line. Daylight firing into enemy positions started many fires and caused secondary explosions, inflicted many enemy casualties and destroyed numerous military structures. Three friendly guerrilla raids were carried out with the support of surface and air units resulting in 239 enemy casualties and the capture of five prisoners.

Vessels of the Republic of Korea Navy conducted close inshore patrols and blockade along both coasts and assisted United Nations Command forces in minesweeping duties.

United Nations Command minesweepers continued operations to keep the channels, gunfire support areas, and anchorages free of mines of all types. Sweepers also enlarged areas and swept close inshore as needed by the operating forces.

United Nations Command naval auxiliary vessels, Military Sea Transportation Service, and merchant vessels under contract provided personnel lifts and logistic support for the United Nations naval, air and ground forces in Japan and Korea.

United Nations Command air activity was highlighted by the joint air force-naval attack on thirteen vital hydroelectric installations in North Korea on 23 and 24 June. This represented the largest combined aerial operation since the beginning of the conflict in Korea. Combined attacks were made against the Suiho power plant and three other plants in the Kongosan complex. Each force attacked six other power plants each in co-ordinated attacks.

Sufficient information was available to the United Nations Command to indicate that these power plants were providing direct support to the Communists' military effort. The generated power was being used in the manufacture and repair of military equipment and explosives. These attacks, based on military considerations alone and conducted against legitimate military targets, were designed to deny the power plants as a source of power for support of the Communist operations in Korea.

On 23 June simultaneous strikes were conducted against the power plants at Suiho, Chosen and Fusen. The Suiho installation on the Yalu River is the largest power plant in Far Eastern Communist territory and is reputedly the fourth largest in the world. The power house was destroyed, transformer and generator units were hit and fires were started in many buildings.

Although the Suiho attack was conducted within sight of large Communist air bases, none of the enemy MIG aircraft based thereon rose to challenge the United Nations Command aircraft. United Nations Command air force interceptors provided protective cover throughout the attack, patrolling to the south and east of the Yalu River. Two MIGs were observed taking off from a Communist base in Manchuria but they landed almost immediately without leaving their sanctuary.

On the other side of the Korean Peninsula the hydroelectric complexes at Fusen, Chosen and Kyonsen were targets for closely co-ordinated and precisely timed attacks of fighter bombers of the United Nations Command air and naval forces. Large explosions and fires were observed in all target areas. Surge tanks were ruptured or completely destroyed and other equipment was damaged beyond repair.

On 24 June, the United Nations Command aircraft returned to the three eastern complexes at Chosen, Fusen and Kyonsen to compound the damage done on the previous day. All pilots returned to their bases safely and only minor damage from anti-aircraft fire was reported. On 26 June the Chosen and Fusen plants were again attacked, resulting in further destruction and damage.

Although the medium bomber effort was held in readiness for attacks on the hydroelectric targets, the effort was diverted to close support and other targets since the fighter attacks were so successful. Evidence of the destruction wrought by the fighter attacks is indicated by the fact that of the thirteen power plants attacked, all are without doubt unserviceable with the exception of Chosen No. One, which is probably unserviceable.

United Nations Command air force medium bombers continued to attack rail bridges on the Kunuri-Kanggye line, tearing out spans and approaches. The largest attack took place on 19/20 June when the medium bombers struck the rail bridge at Myongmundong. Rail traffic between Sinanju and Sinuiju was blocked by attacks on the Munindong Bridge and the Kogunygongdong Crossing. Night operations in close support of the ground forces were greatly increased with excellent results being obtained. These included the largest close support operation by medium bombers since early in the war.

United Nations Command air force interceptors patrolled the northwest areas of Korea whenever the weather permitted, but were able to locate enemy fighters

on only seven days. Although the number of enemy sorties observed was not the lowest yet recorded, the trend toward a decrease in daytime sorties continued as in the past ten weeks.

On 20 June the interceptors caught six enemy LA-9 aircraft on the Korean side of the Yalu River, destroying two and damaging two more. The interceptor pilots also destroyed four MIGs, probably destroying one other.

United Nations Command pilots reported observing ninety-one enemy night fighter sorties. This is the largest number in any comparable period since the start of hostilities. United Nations Command air force night operations continued in force, however, and no friendly aircraft were lost to the Communist night interceptor planes.

Continuing the trend which began early in June, United Nations Command fighter bombers markedly increased their effort on missions designed to inflict the maximum destruction against the enemy's vehicles, rolling stock, supplies and military personnel. These missions consisted of close support along the bomblines, general support within one hundred miles to the rear of the enemy lines, and interdiction attacks deep in enemy territory.

Night intruder aircraft made regular attacks on rail rolling stock and vehicles and reported numerous enemy motor transports destroyed. Continuing the policy of furnishing additional close support for United Nations Command ground forces, the light bombers attacked many targets in the frontline area. The aircraft were aided by ground-controlled radar units and often bombed through overcasts to destroy targets which were reported by the ground units.

Transport aircraft performed regular cargo lift, hauling supplies and equipment to Korea and conducted air resupply missions over certain installations. The cargo aircraft returning from Korea to Japan carried wounded troops and personnel being rotated.

Reconnaissance units continued to conduct photo reconnaissance along the enemy main line of resistance, rear troop and supply locations, main supply routes, airfields, and communications centres, obtaining bomb damage assessment and surveillance photography of these targets, as well as performing surveillance and bomb damage assessment on the North Korean hydroelectric plants.

United Nations Command leaflets, radio broadcasts, and loudspeaker broadcasts gave especial attention to the second anniversary of the brutal Communist assault against the Republic of Korea. These media recounted the circumstances of the unprovoked Communist attack on the Korean people, and reviewed the documentary proof which showed how the Communists had planned their aggression far in advance. The United Nations Command leaflets and broadcasts then recapitulated the events which followed the Communist invasion: the swift answer of the free nations to the Korean Government's request for assistance; the firm consolidation of world-wide popular support behind the forces resisting Communist aggression; the eventual repulse, defeat, and rout of the aggressor forces; and the prolongation of the war by the Chinese Communist invasion of Korea and the Communist obstruction of armistice negotiations.

In the sweep of the North Korean invading army in

1950 to the Pusan perimeter the invaders stripped bare all hospitals and dispensaries; doctors and nurses were kidnapped and carried away into North Korea. In addition to these inroads by the enemy medical facilities and services, the Republic of Korea Army, of necessity, utilized practically all hospitals and many public buildings equipped as emergency hospitals during the first year of the war. Doctors were drafted to serve in the hospitals of the Republic of Korea Army.

Emergency shipments of materials were made from Japan and the United States, principally by air transports, of substantial quantities of drugs, vaccines, serums, antibiotic preparations, and human blood plasma, together with surgical dressings, surgical equipment, and insecticides with insect-control equipment. Quantities of medical supplies for treatment of malaria were made available from United Nations member nations, with additional large quantities from United States Army supplies and procurement, so that at present there is on hand sufficient material to meet the needs in Korea for many years to come. Sulfonamides and antibiotic drugs specifically indicated for the treatment of acute gastro-intestinal infections have been and are continuing to be supplied to meet any emergency in Korea. Serums for treatment of tetanus and diphtheria were supplied in large quantities and used whenever and wherever required. Ample supplies of insecticides, larvicides, spraying and dusting equipment, and water purification chemicals and equipment were expeditiously supplied to control and destroy insect vectors in transmission of communicable diseases and to destroy pathologic organisms in water supply systems.

Public health medical facilities have grown from emergency front line military first aid and evacuation stations to a current programme of 491 dispensaries and ninety-seven hospitals having 9,200 bed spaces. As early as April 1951 there were 283 dispensaries and seventy-one hospitals. Present daily "in patient" load approximates 6,000, monthly "out patient" load approximates 910,000. Four and one-half million patients have been treated since 1 January 1952. In addition, there is one mobile hospital (forty bed capacity) for civilians in each United States combat corps area and one civilian dispensary in each United States division area.

In 1950 the United Nations Command devised a basic medical unit assembly consisting of medical equipment and hospital supplies basically for a forty bed hospital with an initial one-month supply of drugs and other expendable medical items. Dictated by experience in the field, both the basic medical and the hospital unit assembly were changed in Fiscal Year 1952 to meet the particular conditions encountered in Korea. It was found expedient to supply additional canvas cots with each hospital unit to expand the bed capacity two or three times. Equipment and supplies for X-ray diagnosis of internal injuries and fractures were furnished to rehabilitate X-ray service in hospitals. In addition, equipment and supplies to establish nation-wide diagnostic laboratory service for civilians were furnished by the United Nations Command.

Supplies and equipment for 500 small medical teams were distributed throughout Korea in the early part of

1952. These medical teams, located in now urban areas, do the bulk of the medical relief work and immunization in Korea. They were furnished additional expendable supplies from the basic medical unit assembly. Sulfone drugs were made available to institutions for the treatment of 12,000 lepers. Similarly, sufficient streptomycin and para-aminosalicylic acid were furnished for specific treatment to 2,000 tubercular cases in institutions.

Problems of sanitation and medical care were attacked with such success that no large scale epidemics of insect-borne or filth diseases have occurred in South Korea. Moreover, the record of immunizations is remarkable. Sixty-seven per cent of the Korean population were immunized against typhus by Korean nurses and medical teams working in hospitals, dispensaries, and mobile units during the period February thru August 1951; eighty-seven per cent were immunized against typhoid and seventy per cent against smallpox during the same period. As of 1 June 1951, seventy-nine per cent of the population of the port cities had been immunized against cholera. In

addition seventy-five per cent of the population had been dusted with DDT as of 30 September 1951. Latest information indicates that during the first four and one-half months of 1952 deaths from typhoid have averaged only twenty-two per month, as compared with 1,669 per month in 1951; from smallpox thirty-seven per month, as compared with 1,032 per month in 1951; and typhus eighteen per month, as compared with 433 per month in 1951. No cases of cholera have occurred during 1952.

The immunization vaccine programmes since hostilities began have utilized twenty-nine million cc. for typhus; thirty-six million cc. for smallpox; thirty-seven million cc. for typhoid; ten million cc. for cholera. Sanitation supplies furnished to date as follows: ten per cent DDT—4,000,000 pounds; seventy-five per cent DDT—264,455; one hundred per cent DDT—80,000 pounds; five per cent liquid DDT—280,500 gallons; chlorine liquid—132 liquid tons; calcium hypochlorite—161,000 pounds; and boosters—12,500 each; creosol—520 boxes; sprayers—6,153 each; and chlorinators—forty-six each.

The United States in the United Nations

[November 3-7]

Security Council

Dr. T. F. Tsiang, representative of the Republic of China, opened the Nov. 6 meeting in his capacity as president for the month of September. The Soviet representative, Valerian Zorin, immediately challenged his right to the presidency on the grounds that he "does not represent China" and that his "presence in the Security Council is illegal. China can only be represented in the United Nations by a person appointed by the legal Government of China—the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China." Dr. Tsiang replied:

This point of order was raised a year ago when I in my turn became the President of the Security Council. I ruled then that it was out of order. Its repetition does not make it any more correct than on the previous occasion. I again say that it is out of order.

Kashmir dispute—The U.S. and the U.K. on November 6 introduced a resolution urging that India and Pakistan begin negotiations in New York immediately to work out a specific agreement on demilitarization of their forces in Kashmir. The resolution recommended that the forces on the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line number 3,000 to 6,000 and on the Indian side of the cease-fire line number 12,000 to 18,000, as suggested by Frank P. Graham, the U.N. representative for India and Pakistan, on July 16, 1952. Both sides would report back to the Council on the progress

of their negotiations within 30 days after adoption of the resolution.

Following are excerpts from the statement of Sir Gladwyn Jebb (U.K.), who opened the debate:

In a world beset by so many intractable and seemingly insoluble problems, this particular one has always seemed to be eminently susceptible to settlement by reasoned negotiations and compromise. I am sure that my colleagues on the Security Council will agree with me on one thing: that it is the plain duty of the Council to use its best endeavours to promote such a settlement.

The parties have agreed—and they have many times reaffirmed their agreement—to decide the future accession of the State by means of a free and impartial plebiscite to be held under the auspices of the United Nations. And I repeat that: "under the auspices of the United Nations." Can the United Nations, therefore, do other than continue to strive to create the conditions in which this plebiscite may be held? Indeed, the danger, which we all have reason to fear might arise, to the peaceful relations of the peoples of India and Pakistan if this question were to be shelved by the United Nations is enough to persuade us that there can be—or there should be—no relaxation of effort on our part to bring about a settlement.

In the first place, as we understand it, it has been agreed by the two Governments that demilitarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir should be effected in a single continuous process. We, for our part, have always felt that this would be more logical and, indeed, more suitable than for the demilitarization to be done in two separate operations, as provided for in the resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949. We therefore welcome the acceptance by the parties of Dr. Graham's proposal on this point.

It has also been agreed that on the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line the tribesmen and Pakistan nationals not normally resident in the State will have been with-

drawn by the end of the period of demilitarization. In fact, we understand that this has long been the case. Nevertheless, we welcome also this restatement of agreement by the two parties.

We understand that they are further agreed that the Pakistan regular army units should be withdrawn from the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line and that on the Indian side of the cease-fire line the bulk of the Indian and State armed forces should likewise be withdrawn. These are the steps which the two Governments concerned have agreed on as the method of reducing the military forces in the State to whatever final figures they may determine between them.

Dr. Graham has also reported that they have accepted his proposal that demilitarization should be conducted in such a way as to involve no threat to the cease-fire agreement either during or after the demilitarization period. This seems to us at any rate to be of great significance. If it is taken as a criterion in deciding the stages by which the extent to which the military forces on each side of the cease-fire line should be reduced, it should provide a way of resolving at least the major differences of view that may exist between the two Governments. We believe that Dr. Graham, in suggesting the limits within which the final number of armed forces on each side of the cease-fire line should be fixed, was guided by this principle.

If the two Governments could now decide on a final figure for the strength of their armed forces within the limits suggested by Dr. Graham and, indeed, within the limits which we have incorporated into our draft resolution, they can, we think, assure themselves that, in spite of a considerable reduction in the strength of the armed forces on each side of the cease-fire line, this reduction will, at any rate, involve no threat to the integrity or to the security of the territory on either side.

Therefore, it is our view that, within these limits, final figures for the strength of the armed forces on each side of the cease-fire line can and should be determined; that within these limits figures could be agreed upon which would enable a free and impartial plebiscite to be arranged—and this must, in our view, be the first and principal consideration—and which would at the same time take into account the need to safeguard law and order, the integrity of the cease-fire line and the security of the territory on each side of that line.

In the draft resolution which the United Kingdom and the United States have placed before the Council, attention is sought to be concentrated on this one question, namely, of determining finally the figures to which the armed forces on both sides of the cease-fire line are to be reduced. It will be seen that the suggestion contained in the draft resolution is that the two Governments should negotiate directly with each other to this end. We would hope that Dr. Graham will be ready to assist the two parties in any way they may indicate, and we have framed the draft resolution so as to provide for this possibility. We would hope, however, that the Council will agree that at this moment the primary responsibility for working out an agreement should lie with the two Governments themselves. The United Kingdom Government, therefore, would earnestly hope that the Governments of India and Pakistan would each appoint representatives with adequate powers to enable them to negotiate a final agreement on demilitarization. In the draft resolution we have suggested that these negotiations should take place in New York. This seems likely to be the most convenient arrangement since, after all, while the General Assembly is in session, the ministers and representatives of the two Governments who will be concerned with the negotiations are in addition likely to be engaged with the work of the General Assembly.

It will also be seen that the draft resolution requests the two Governments to inform the Security Council of the results of their negotiations within a period of thirty days. In view of the urgency of a solution and the narrow gap, as we think, to which the differences between the two parties seem to have been brought, the sponsors

U.S.-U.K. Draft Resolution on Kashmir

U.N. doc. S/2839 dated Nov. 5, 1952

The Security Council

RECALLING its resolutions of 30 March 1951, 30 April 1951, and 10 November 1951:

FURTHER RECALLING the provisions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 which were accepted by the Governments of India and Pakistan and which provided that the question of the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India or Pakistan will be decided through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite conducted under the auspices of the United Nations;

HAVING RECEIVED the Third Report dated 22 April 1952 and the Fourth Report dated 16 September 1952 of the United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan:

ENDORSES the general principles on which the United Nations Representative has sought to bring about agreement between the Governments of India and Pakistan;

NOTES with gratification that the United Nations Representative has reported that the Governments of India and Pakistan have accepted all but two of the paragraphs of his twelve point proposals;

NOTES that agreement on a plan of demilitarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir has not been reached because the Governments of India and Pakistan have not agreed on the whole of paragraph 7 of the twelve point proposals;

URGES the Governments of India and Pakistan to enter into immediate negotiations at the Headquarters of the United Nations in order to reach agreement on the specific number of forces to remain on each side of the cease fire line at the end of the period of demilitarization, this number to be between 3,000 and 6,000 armed forces remaining on the Pakistan side of the cease fire line and between 12,000 and 18,000 armed forces remaining on the India side of the cease fire line, as suggested by the United Nations Representative in his proposals of 16 July 1952 (Annex III of S/2783) such specific numbers to be arrived at bearing in mind the principles of criteria contained in paragraph 7 of the United Nations Representative's proposal of 4 September 1952 (Annex VIII of S/2783);

RECORDS its gratitude to the United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan for the great efforts which he has made to achieve a settlement and REQUESTS him to continue to make his services available to the Governments of India and Pakistan to this end;

REQUESTS the Governments of India and Pakistan to report to the Security Council not later than thirty days from the date of the adoption of this resolution; and further requests the United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan to keep the Security Council informed of any progress.

of the draft resolution believe that members of the Council will think it desirable that a further report should be placed before them within the period which we have indicated in the draft resolution.

Once agreement is reached on the level of the armed forces at the end of demilitarization, surely it will be but a short step for representatives of the two Governments, sitting in joint session with military experts, of course, to draw up a detailed programme of disbandment and withdrawal.

The two Governments have already agreed that such a programme should be carried through within ninety days from the date of its signature by them. Within a matter

of months, therefore, we might hope to see the forces in Kashmir reduced to the level at which a fair and impartial plebiscite could take place. Within a matter of months we might hope to see the plebiscite administrator formally appointed and established inside Kashmir to begin the final task of preparing for the voting to take place.

So near are we to a solution—or so it seems to us—of this difficult and dangerous problem which has so long exercised our minds and unsettled and weakened an extensive and vitally important region of the world; so near are we to a solution if only the spirit of compromise and the determination of both parties to achieve a settlement can be brought to grapple with the outstanding differences between them.

The sponsors of this draft resolution hope that there will be no tendency on the part of either of the two Governments to go behind the agreements enshrined in the two agreed resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan. These resolutions, as we think, contain all the elements of a settlement. Reinforced and amplified as they are by the agreements of the two Governments to all but 2 of Dr. Graham's 12 proposals, they provide the Security Council and the parties with a framework on which to build, and they also provide certain agreed principles according to which that building should be done.

The ultimate objective of a fair and impartial plebiscite under the auspices of the United Nations has, after all, been written into solemn agreements by the two Governments and endorsed by this Security Council. These agreements have been affirmed and reaffirmed by the two Governments many times during the last three and a half years. The transformation of this agreement into the reality of the actual voting ought not to present insuperable difficulties. We have recently seen the tremendous achievement—if I may say so, with respect—of the Government of India in organizing and carrying through a fully democratic election throughout its vast territory. From this great example it is clear that the will of the people of Kashmir and Jammu in this question of accession could be ascertained without any insuperable difficulty.

Is it therefore too much to hope that the two Governments can now resolve their differences and show by example how the precepts which the United Nations frequently affirms can be put into practical effect and made the instrument of a political settlement which would not only satisfy the aspirations of the people of Jammu and Kashmir but would also add greatly, as we all know, to the happiness, prosperity and security of peoples throughout the free world?

General Assembly

Refugee Relief Plan Adopted—On November 6 the Assembly adopted by a vote of 48-0-6 (Soviet bloc, Iraq) the plan recommended by Committee III for continuing aid to the Palestine refugees (see BULLETIN of Nov. 10, p. 756).

Japan Admitted to ICAO—At the same session the Assembly approved Japan's application for membership in the U.N. International Civil Aviation Organization. The vote was 53-0-6 (Soviet bloc, Philippines).

Peace Observation Commission—The Assembly reappointed for 1953 and 1954 the members of the 2-year-old U.N. Peace Observation Commission (China, Colombia, Czechoslovakia, France, India, Iraq, Israel, New Zealand, Pakistan, Sweden, U.S.S.R., U.K., U.S., and Uruguay).

U.N. Staff—Secretary-General Trygve Lie on

Nov. 7 announced the appointment of William De Witt Mitchell of the United States, Sir Edwin Herbert of the United Kingdom, and Paul Veldekens of Belgium to advise him on questions arising from the refusal of certain U.N. employees to answer questions concerning possible Communist activities put to them by a subcommittee of the Senate Internal Security Committee. The three will try to resolve "certain issues of law and policy regarding the conduct required of international civil service."

Ad Hoc Political Committee—The Committee on Nov. 3 began consideration of the question of the treatment of people of Indian origin in the Union of South Africa.

Mrs. Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit (India) introduced on behalf of her delegation, and 13 other delegations, a draft resolution calling for the establishment of a three-member United Nations Good Offices Commission, "with a view to arranging and assisting in negotiations between the Government of the Union of South Africa and the Governments of India and Pakistan in order that a satisfactory solution of the question in accordance with the principles and purposes of the Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights may be achieved."

Pending solution of the negotiations, the Government of the Union of South Africa would be asked to suspend the enforcement of the provisions of the Group Areas Act, a controversial legislative act referred to in previous General Assembly resolutions on this subject.

The Good Offices Commission would be asked to report to the next session of the Assembly and the item would be retained on the agenda.

G. P. Jooste (Union of South Africa) stated his Government's continued adherence to the position that this matter was one falling within its domestic jurisdiction and that therefore the Assembly was debarred by the terms of Article 2 (7) "from concerning itself with it in any way whatsoever."

Mr. Jooste said that under such circumstances the South African Government "cannot be required, legally and therefore legitimately, to give effect to the Assembly resolution on this matter, however well intentioned or however frequently repeated." These resolutions, he added, were mostly conceived "in a spirit of condemnation."

Speaking on Nov. 5, Charles A. Sprague (U.S.) indicated this country's support for a Good Offices Commission. He emphasized that its objective must be to bring together the parties to the dispute for the purpose of working out a mutually satisfactory solution.

Committee I (Political and Security)—Two draft resolutions on Korea were introduced Nov. 3. Peru proposed a commission to deal with the repatriation issue. Under Peru's plan, prisoners who were unwilling to return home after the cessation of hostilities would be placed under the

jurisdiction of the proposed commission, which would act as a "good offices committee" for all prisoners. Mexico circulated a resolution based on the proposal of President Miguel Alemán which was transmitted to the Secretary-General on Sept. 2.¹

There are now four resolutions relating to the Korean item before the Committee. Secretary Acheson introduced the first resolution, sponsored by 21 countries, on Oct. 24; the second was submitted on Oct. 29 by the U.S.S.R.

Committee II (Economic and Financial)—In the course of general debate on economic development of underdeveloped countries, the Committee on Nov. 6 heard a two-hour statement by Andrei Gromyko (U.S.S.R.) on the Soviet view as to the reasons for the lack of development in the areas under discussion. These countries were not masters of their own resources, he charged, but were controlled in many cases by foreign investors who reaped the profits. He attacked the U.S. for using underdeveloped areas as sources of strategic war materials, for devising the Point Four Program for nefarious purposes, and for selling exports at high prices while obtaining bargains in raw materials. No international organization could help underprivileged countries under present circumstances, he concluded.

Committee III (Social, Humanitarian and Cultural)—In the course of its consideration of freedom of information, the Committee, on November 3, rejected an amended U.S.S.R. draft resolution which, as originally drafted, sought to prevent the use of information media for any kind of propaganda in favor of aggression and war, racial discrimination, slanderous rumors, or false and distorted reports. The final roll-call vote by which the proposal as a whole was defeated was 21-19, with 12 abstentions. During the Committee's debate on the proposal on November 3, Charles A. Sprague (U.S.) attempted in a detailed statement "to expose the hypocrisy of the Soviet Union" in proposing this resolution. He said that "in order to condition the thinking of the Russian people the Soviet Government controlled the press and radio, restricted the entry of foreigners, and denied Soviet citizens freedom to travel abroad." He charged that "the calculated distortion and hate-mongering" against the U.S. in the Soviet press, which was "controlled down to the last comma," had reached an all-time low following the out-break of the Korean war. To support this contention, he quoted from the Soviet press and displayed Soviet cartoons.²

¹ BULLETIN of Nov. 3, 1952, p. 696.

² For texts of Mr. Sprague's previous statements on freedom of information, see p. 789.

Committee IV (Trusteeship)—Without a dissenting vote, the Committee on Nov. 3 approved a draft resolution on race discrimination in dependent territories. The resolution would have the General Assembly recommend to powers administering dependent territories:

- (1) Abolition of discriminatory laws.
- (2) Examination of all laws, and their application in the territories, to abolish discriminatory provisions and practices, "of a racial or religious character."
- (3) Examination of laws distinguishing between "citizens and non-citizens, primarily on racial or religious grounds."
- (4) Opening all public facilities to inhabitants of the territories, without race distinction.
- (5) Examination of laws providing "particular measures of protection for sections of the population" to see whether exemptions should be made.
- (6) All measures designed to improve "understanding among all pupils in all schools of the needs and problems of the community as a whole."

In a roll-call vote on the resolution as a whole, 46 nations voted in favor. France and India abstained and twelve countries were not present for the voting. The text as adopted represented a draft resolution proposed by the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories, as amended by Venezuela, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The U.S. amendment would refer the resolution to the Commission on Human Rights.

Committee V (Administrative and Budgetary)—On Nov. 4, 1953 appropriations as recommended by the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions for the United Nations Office at Geneva (Section 20) were approved in the amount of \$4,306,800. The appropriation, subject to possible further supplementary estimates, was approved as a whole by a vote of 41 to 5 with 1 abstention, following a chapter-by-chapter examination.

The Committee also approved a U.S.S.R. motion requesting the Advisory Committee to make a comprehensive study of the work of the Geneva office with a view to submitting to the eighth session of the Assembly "practical recommendations for the efficient and economical use of the offices, staff and premises" in the light of any decisions the General Assembly may take on the future schedule of conferences. The U.S.S.R. proposal was approved by a vote of 45 to 1 with 1 abstention.

Other U.S.S.R. proposals to reduce appropriations for general services at Geneva by \$100,000 and for common staff costs for the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees by \$71,000 were rejected.

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| †864 | 11/7 | Wiesman: Inter. labor cooperation |

*Not printed.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.